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The initial PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) effort in Iraq commenced in earnest 
throughout 2005 and early 2006. The intended process of facilitating provincial capacity, 
although, met a number of obstacles throughout its execution. A key inquiry of the 
following text has been what have been the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs 
in meeting the mission of ‘capacity development’? Have existing efforts to identify the 
mission, organization, and effectiveness of PRTs allowed for the identification of 
logistical, physical, and organizational threats to PRT operations? Could the resulting 
area of foci, as identifying the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs, allow for the 
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“PRTs are intended to be interim structures, after a PRT has achieved its goal of 
improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow for traditional development efforts to 
occur.” 
 
“To accomplish their missions, PRTs engage in and fund a variety of activities, such as 
developing the capacity of local governments through engagement with local 
stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business development, agriculture, public 
health initiatives, and governance; and supporting the delivery of basic social services.” 
1 
 
The initial PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) effort in Iraq commenced in earnest 
throughout 2005 and early 2006. Aiming to increase the developmental capacity of local 
government level in all Iraqi provinces, PRTs were uniquely composed of civilian and 
military personnel to address the mission of ‘capacity development’ within the battle 
space the existing combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast to the 
existing backdrop, the targeted geographic signature of the PRT effort was to occur at 
the human scale, in support of one of the PRT’s intended goals, to support the 
expansion and decentralization of government services.  
 
A resulting, yet initial, question of the following body of research was, as follows: How 
effective were Provincial Reconstruction Teams in pursuing reconstruction and 
development activities, present to ongoing military operations? Pursuant to measuring 
the effectiveness of selected PRT initiatives, a subsequent inquiry has required the 
identification of present conflicts threatening the operational capacity of the PRT. One 
such threat, as an exemplar, may lie in personnel qualifications, selection, and mix. 
 
                                                 
1 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, United States Government Accountability 
Office, 01 October 2008. 
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Within the initial year of operations, although, obstacles towards the execution of PRT 
selected development initiatives confronted the PRT mission. The task, which once 
could have been summarily considered post conflict development, soon became 
focused on supporting stabilization initiatives in an active military intervention. 
Stabilization efforts, in turn, would thereafter support the instruments to allow for 
‘capacity development’. Respectively, the creation of a successful diplomatic effort 
focused on nation building, grew from an effort with modest goals to one charged with 
marked challenges. As a result, the encountered obstacles to the operational capacity 
of PRTs, to meet the intended mission of the newly formed CM (Civilian Military) units, 
catalyzed the assessment of threats to PRT personnel, mission, and capability.  
 
At the core, the nature of the PRT process was to manage the rapid mobilization of 
resources, to tackle long term development issues. The mission to strengthen local 
governance, although, was identified as the catalyst to strengthen future development 
initiatives. In doing so, increasing the legitimacy of local centers of power would address 
the drivers of instability stalling provincial capacity, consequent to territorial conflict. 
Selected areas of focus were to include local security, infrastructure, and basic social 
services.  
  
The intended process of facilitating provincial capacity, although, met a number of 
obstacles throughout its execution. Overcoming the complications of managing the PRT 
based development effort has, as a result, been the focus of ongoing and past research. 
Attention has been given to the internal challenges in the organization, staffing, and 
funding of PRTs in Iraq. The benefit of research into the organization, staffing, and 
funding of PRTs has been to perform an analysis of the initial threats to the structure 
and methods pursued under the PRT effort in Iraq.  
 
The aforementioned course of research which I identify and seek to engage in the 
following body of work, although, addresses an issue greater than the singular 
discussion of PRTs in Iraq. The addressed issues, consequently, should be of critical 
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interest to the segment of international development, interrogating the efficacy of 
development efforts situated in active military interventions, whether they are pursued 
by relief, humanitarian, or non-governmental organizations. The result of the research 
should determine what courses of organizational behavior are most successful amongst 
civilian and military planners, when confronted with the responsibility of increasing 
‘capacity development’ at the provincial and district level. This may include, but is not 
limited to, supporting local governance, delivering key services, such as sanitation 




Though, beyond the direct measures of PRT output lays the research question of the 
current text: How effective were Provincial Reconstruction Teams in pursuing 
reconstruction and development activities, present to ongoing military operations? To 
answer this question, although, a key inquiry of the following text has been, what have 
been the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission of ‘capacity 
development’?  
 
Have existing efforts to identify the mission, organization, and effectiveness of PRTs 
allowed for the identification of logistical, physical, and organizational threats to PRT 
operations? This inquiry, although, results in the requirement to comprehensively 
identify the PRT itself, through existing literature, in order to identify the unit and 




The hypothesis of research at present, although, will not and cannot directly address the 
answer to the research question: How effective were Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
in pursuing reconstruction and development activities, present to ongoing military 
operations and to a further extent, what have been the threats to the operational 
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capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission of ‘capacity development’? 
 
The hypothesis will be drawn from the review and inquiry of extant literature respective 
to PRT engagements in Iraq from 2005 ‒ 2010.  
 
Withstanding a lack of access to metrics which measure and serve as the indicators of 
PRT output, a study sourced in periodic research of PRTs from multiple authors would 
nevertheless allow for a comprehensive identification of the limitations, constraints, and 
threats to the operational capacity of PRTs. Further, the lack of direct access to the 
measured indicators of PRT output will greater allows a focus to be drawn on the 
internal challenges in the organization, staffing, and funding of PRTs in Iraq. 
 
The hypothesis will be tested through the collection and analysis of qualitative data, as 
outlined by the research methodology of the current text.  
 
Should the assumptions underlying the hypothesis prove incorrect, a review of existing 
criticism should not allow for a comprehensive view of threats to the operational 
capacity of PRTs and disallow for suggested areas of focus. In the opposite case, a 
positive result would yield resulting comprehensive areas of foci, as identifying the 
threats to the operational capacity of PRTs, would allow for the ability remediate areas 















Impacts on Planning & International Development 
 
The pursuit of PRTs on behalf of allied interests in Iraq and neighboring regions, for 
several years, has allowed for the rich availability of data and best practices. Although 
the nature of data may be qualitative in nature, as well as conceived to address policy 
goals and program advancement, the extent of available materials implicitly allows for 
additional review.   
 
Lessons learned through the lifecycle of PRTs could contribute to several areas of 
planning and international development, including, but not limited to acclimation to the 
supra-experiential, a further allowance for the development of cultural sensitivities, the 
application of existing methodologies in situ, and conversely the immediate opportunity 
to locally source apropos programs. The cumulative effects of lessons culled from past 
practices, as can be drawn from PRTs, should result in the exercise of identifying 
forgone opportunities for increased situational awareness, organizational insight, and 
corrective measures.   
 
An analysis of the PRT process further identifies a particular suite, and the diversity 
thereof, of skills addressed in professional practice. In the case of participation within 
the PRT process, professional competencies are required as well as acclimation to a 
continued exposure in the field. A review of the strengths and shortcomings of the 
process may also illustrate individual areas where further training may be required prior 
to the regime of work required in the PRT process. This may include, but is not limited 
to, the rapid and competent execution of, field collection (land use inventories), 
economic analysis, demography, and an ability to integrate with non SME personnel, 
requiring the ability to negotiate as in the highly political practice of planning in the 




This additional inquiry also addresses a practice that extends beyond the traditional 
notion of public ¦ private sector management; development of urban and rural assets. 
Although still representative of a practice to focus on areas of investment and 
disinvestment, growth and contraction, the identified practice herein has occurred in the 
midst of conflict and regional/ local hostilities. The parallel, at once, could portend an 
expansion in the field of professional practice under international development.   
 
The extended and here discussed situation of professionals working within the vein of 
planning, seeks to identify international development as, first, the complex network of a 
stakeholders, both global, national, regional, and local; the identification also, implicitly, 
























The application of measures concerning traditional development and planning efforts 
against PRTs can assist in revealing not only the difficulties of the PRT process, but 
potential areas of improvement as well. The following concerns include queries which 
could be made of the process as an initial method of critical reasoning during the initial 
stages of development. The inquiries should also be considered throughout subsequent 
research of singular areas of the PRT process, as will occur herein. Each question, 
although positioned for context, could easily become purposed an additional study. 
 
x What are the short term and long term effects of conflict parallel development 
efforts? 
 
x Can net positive long term effects be reached through the application of short 
term skills and financing? 
 
x How does the PRT model define and target military security versus human 
security; economic, social, and political security? 
 
x How does the selected personnel mix reflect the given methods of development 
practiced under a PRT? 
 
x Does the PRT model address long term development efforts to normalize the 
lives of those who have endured cycles of social calamity? 
 
x How does the PRT model take into account the incorporation of existing 





x Does the PRT effort address the critical concern of instability and the loss of 
growth as a result of the given course of DDR in Iraq? 
 
x Does the PRT support and enforce the creation of employment as a method of 
counterinsurgency? 
 
x How does the PRT process address the demobilized and their future relationship 
to existing institutions? 
 
In the case of PRTs, establishing the context of those efforts remains of critical 
importance. It will serve to demonstrate the absence where further research is 
























The provision for a working body of knowledge regarding Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) requires a review of existing literature regarding the practice. It will 
attempt to establish the field of study through the identification of actors and their 
inquiries. This includes, but is not limited to queries regarding the actors, practices, and 
results. The goal of the review is to establish the context of the field of study. It also 
demonstrates the absence where further research is necessary, if performed against 
the framework of existing research. This would be fulfilled through the research question 
posed though an additional study. 
 
In the case of PRTs, establishing the context of study is of critical importance. The 
methods by which research is performed on the activity, as is the case with many state 
sponsored activities, follows an established chain of events by which inquiry and 
discovery occurs as a chronology.  
 
The following, prior to the literature review itself, is to a limited extent the context in 















Research of PRTs 
 
Research into the Provincial Reconstruction Team and its internal processes is both 
limited and rich for a unique set of limitations. Because the PRT is an extension of the 
United States Government, both its civil and military services, it is promised a certain 
amount of oversight, congressional inquiry, and funding. At the same time, due to the 
frequently compartmentalized nature of detailed military action, inquiry into the 
government practices can become challenging and limit the types of actors and 
organizations whom are able to provide a context of the practices.  
 
The limitations which parallel inquiry into the PRT development and implementation 
process both limit and catalyze a certain brand of research. The primary actors, whom 
are at minimum capable of executing a faithful and permissive inquiry into the process, 
derive primarily from the public sector, including government offices, public officials, and 
a limited set of public actors.  
 
Research into government practice and PRTs ostensibly, requires a methodology for 
material discovery that may not parallel common academic practices. Often, certain 
government and military practices, and their documentation, are neither public facing or 
become popularly detailed in the media. Yet, as often also guided by strict procedure, it 
is possible through the familiarity of government offices and organizations which 
maintain the resources, personnel, and reserved interests, to interrogate these 
government practices through content analysis. 
  
Research of PRTs, and civil/ military actions, catalyze a limited set of interests, from 
government auditing, national security, and congressional oversight. As the nature of 
the inquiry corresponds to the interests of the intervening actor, the results parallel a 
certain set of interests, through testimony, figures, and expectations. The level of detail 
also becomes commensurate with the level of scrutiny applied, whereby a scheduled 
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briefing may reveal less of a particular government practice than congressional 
testimony. To properly detail the whole nature of PRTs and similar phenomena, it 
becomes necessary to review several sources of research to draw a comprehensive 
image of PRT activities. It also becomes necessary to draw from several published 
sources of research, in addition to documentation requisite of government practice, to 
properly identify the sources and origin of certain facts.  
 
Actors which have played a key role in detailing the activities of PRTs include, but are 
not limited to, the United States Government Accounting Office, the National Security 
Research Division ¦ RAND, the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction ¦ United States Department of State, the United States Department of 
Defense, the Commission of Wartime Contracting, and the Senate Committee for 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. Each has played a role in detailing relevant 
operational details of PRT activities and has identified the respective context where 
shortcomings have occurred.   
 
Because the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a joint venture between select 
federal agencies, e.g. United States Department of State, United States Department of 
Justice, United States Department of Agriculture, and United States Department of 
Defense, it is uniquely a civilian/ military venture operating within the same environs 
which are occupied by predominantly military personnel. Therefore, the PRT can be 
classified as a tandem instrument for reconstruction and security instrument in foreign 













Because the operation of PRTs occurs in a space that may not be publicly accessible, 
by physical or information gathering methods, the methods of inquiry into PRTs are 
limited to particular channels as with many state functions.   
 
The execution of a state supported foreign intervention, especially those which contain 
a component of military activity in addition to diplomatic efforts, separate components 
which focus on direct action, public, and civil affairs. Their distinction is so to effectively 
sever the functions of the mission and public relations.  
 
In this respect, the efforts are not always symmetrical in personnel strength, as is 
common with military activity wherein delegated authority to public relations is not as 
great as the achievement of mission objectives themselves. This disparity can be 
identified in the time requirements of PRT activity itself and the briefing which details the 
respective activity. It is also due in part to he often classified nature of discreet military 
activities and the necessity to maintain operational security. 
 
This is evident in the order and procession of Department of Defense briefings held on 
region specific military activities. These briefings can be understood as one of the initial 
steps in the development of research related to the state activity. Scheduled briefings 
held by the Department of Defense, in the Pentagon Briefing Room, have primarily 
occurred before an audience of reporters to news organizations and the like. It is in this 
setting that information related to reconstruction related activities in Iraq is first held as a 
forum. It also represents the first public attempt to reconstruct a diagram of the foreign 
activity. 
 
In this setting, certain questions are addressed in detail and others are given a 
summary response on the direction of certain activities. In regards to PRT activity, the 
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site of operations may be addressed wherein the details of operations themselves are 
not readily in discussion. This may be due to the disconnect between public affairs and 
the apparatus itself, operational security, or the common difficulty to express the nuance 
of security activities as sound bites. 
 
The public facing result, as seen respective to chronology, summarily describes PRTs, 
addressing briefly the who, what, when, where, why, and how, performed in the 
absence of a granular level of detail. Although, it is not at that time sufficient to draw an 
assessment, that classifies, identifies, and properly gauges the effects of PRT activity. It 
is neither possible to address the planning, practices, and review of the reconstruction 
effort, in these early stages of interrogation. 
 
The aforementioned represents the first wave of inquiry. Subsequent measures that 
detail state sponsored PRT activities include, but are not limited to, congressional 
testimony, government oversight, and interagency assessments. It is in these later 
stages of inquiry that the second wave of actors, whom bear interest in the inquiry of the 
state sponsored activity in question, are afforded the opportunity to question activities in 
greater detail. This is due in part to their permanency and stake in the interest. It is in 
this period that interrogating practices from actors, such as government organizations 














Resulting Research Typologies 
 
Due to the aforementioned methods of discovery, which may channel responses 
particular to the inquiry, paired already to the selective interest of a unique organization, 
the likelihood of compendium resulting from the discreet inquiry of any particular 
organization is unlikely. The resulting research typologies, rather, have drawn their 
focus on an area of limited scope, as rendered their mission, personnel, and resources.   
 
Although the tenets for a summary review of existing literature remain the same, (e.g. 
what is the field of study, who are the researchers, what are the questions), the resulting 
review is less a comparative analysis than a synthesis of discreet units of discovery. 
The following threading of these findings allows for the summary account of PRTs, their 
functions, purpose, interrogators, and effects. 
 
The following is a review of research focused on the study of PRTs in Iraq and to an 

















Concepts and Development 
 
In the intended focus of the following course of research to identify how the personnel 
selection of the PRT unit is able to support the broader target of post conflict 
reconstruction and development, one requisite is the review of sources which have 
identified the scope of the PRT process in the aforementioned respect. In identifying the 
development of the PRT unit, the formation of Civilian Military relations prior to 
operations in Iraq speaks to the intentions of succeeding PRT efforts.  
 
In the Journal of Development and Social Transformation, as part of an assessment of 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept prior to the deployment of personnel in 
Iraq, Robert Borders identifies the origins of the PRT as the creation of discreet CM 
Civilian-Military Units. These units were developed to address the needs of conflict 
interim and post conflict development. 2 The article further provides a scope of PRT 
origins, purpose, and an au courant operational picture of PRT activity prior to their 
deployment in Iraq.  
 
For the purposes of portraying the intended linear relationship between personnel and 
field specializations, selections from the text will be drawn to characterize the positive 
relationship between personnel selection and CM¦ PRT activity.  
 
An initial argument in support of the CM involvement in the delivery of aid, whether it 
function as provisions for security, services, or traditional development is simply the 
expressed need for a vehicle that can perform in post conflict and conflict interim 
environments. 3 This need would withstand the criticism that the delivery of aid through 
                                                 
2 “In response to the need for action in expediting the post-conflict reconstruction process in Afghanistan, 
the United States and its coalition partners created specialized civil-military (CM) units known as 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRT’s as they are commonly referred to.” (p. 5 Borders) 
 
3 “The intent of this paper is to offer a pragmatic argument in support of the PRT concept being employed 
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CM units is solely purposed to serve foreign policy interests. 4 
 
The impetus to align relief efforts, whether they were to target security or aid, with 
civilian efforts was meant to counter key criticisms of a sole military effort to redress aid, 
relief, and reconstruction. These criticisms primarily extended to the lack of expertise, 
duplication of efforts, and the militarization of what has been understood as 
humanitarian spaces. 5 In the juxtaposition of civilian and military efforts, CM efforts 
would be able to achieve a return on increased security through COIN efforts as well as 
deliver instruments of aid in a secured environment. It is for these reasons, the CM 
effort was determined to be an expressed need where singular NGO efforts would be 
unable to perform and pursue traditional development efforts in active zones of conflict.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Afghanistan as a model for post-conflict reconstruction and development, despite objections from some 
practitioners within the international aid community who view it as the embodiment of what they term the 
“new humanitarianism” or politicization of aid.” (p.5 Borders) 
 
4 “The objection is to the government’s use of aid and development as a vehicle to reinforce strategic 
policy objectives. From a humanitarian viewpoint, this objection is congruous with the sacrosanct principle 
that aid must be provided strictly on the basis of need, with “no strings attached.” (p.5 Borders) 
 
5 “The opposition from the non-government organization (NGO) community to the PRT concept can 
generally be summed up in six major points: 
 
1. It violates the central humanitarian tenet that aid must be provided in a neutral and impartial manner 
based solely on the criteria of need, i.e., aid should not be politicized. 
2. It is a further encroachment of “humanitarian space” traditionally occupied by the NGO community. 
3. The use of soldiers in humanitarian aid projects blurs the lines of distinction between non-combatant 
aid workers and soldiers, thereby placing NGO personnel at greater risk. 
4. It is cost-ineffective and a duplication of services and projects already available and provided by the 
international aid community. 
5. The military does not have the capacity for this type of work and their efforts actually create more harm 
than good, jeopardizing long-term development projects and relationships with the local people. 




Further, although extant criticism identifies the increased costs of facilitating 
reconstruction and development efforts through the use of CM¦ PRTs, an anticipated 
purpose of the original CM units would only be directed at operations where neither 
NGOs would be or willing to operate. As a circumstance of conflict interim and post 
conflict development, security concerns are cited as the factor which would preclude the 
potential overlap of PRT and NGO activity. 6 
 
In the resulting areas targeted for CM activity, speaking to the functions which the CM 
unit would best perform, the activities to which the CM units would be tasked would 
speak directly to their composition as a unit of mixed personnel. Of the key functions 
which the CM unit may be able to perform, one is the facilitation of civil governance 
functions. 7 This ability is borne from the inclusion of civilian personnel, selected for their 
experience in public sector services and governance. The integrity of civil military 
relations is further maintained in facilitating local governance through additional training 
on institutional operations, regional expertise, and local knowledge. 8 
                                                 
6 “In a February 2003 report, critics say that in addition to a lack of expertise and the fact that 
development projects are viewed as a public relations exercise, they go on to make the point that NGO’s 
and locals are a much cheaper alternative to reconstruction than bringing in the military (ReliefWeb: IRIN, 
February 2003). Absent any hard statistical data or activity-based costing metric to verify this claim, 
presumably critics are inferring that overhead costs are generally greater for the military than for aid 
organizations. This may be true, but without an equivalent comparison of all true associated costs, it is 
impossible to offer an objective argument to support this contention. Another related point that deserves 
mention is that PRT’s also use local labor and they predominantly operate in areas where NGO’s either 
will not, or cannot operate because of security concerns.” (p.6¦7 Borders) 
 
7 “Therefore it is necessary to provide a brief overview on the topic of military civil-affairs (CA) units from 
which the PRT concept was borne. CA units differ from regular military forces in that they are designed 
and trained to facilitate civil-governance functions and public sector services, as opposed to troops and 
units that are equipped and trained to conduct combat operations.” (p.7 Borders) 
 
8 “CA units are designed and specially trained to facilitate coordination between military and civilian 
authorities in order to deconflict operational matters (civil or military) that can impact one or more key 
players involved in the reconstruction effort. An excerpt from that table follows: 
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The intended performance in targeting civil and governance functions would be assisted 
not only through the inclusion of civilian staff, but through use of reservists, in respect to 
selected military personnel. The selection of reservists would bring additional skills to 
the CM unit, whom would possess both military and civilian skills. These skills could 
include, but would not be limited to, social services, public works, and education. 9 The 
identification and inclusion of atypical military personnel, in respect to additional 
skillsets, would further support the integrative environment of military and specialized 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
• The use of forces (units and personnel) possessing an in-depth understanding of politico-military, 
economic, and social aspects of countries or regional areas where military forces are employed; 
 
• Civil military operational planning and execution by DoD, non-DoD, multinational, nongovernmental 
organizations/private voluntary organizations, and other agencies through estimates of operational 
impacts on civilian populace, resources, and institutions in areas where military forces are employed 
(Joint Publication 3-57, p.62). 
 
While military CA units are comprised of soldiers, they are not combat-troops in the traditional sense, nor 
are they trained as such. They have a unique skill set, or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), designed 
to provide commanders in the field with resident technical capability and expertise on all matters related 
to civil affairs.” (p. 8 Borders) 
 
9 “Reserve CA units throughout the United States actively target their recruitment at individuals who 
already possess the functional specialty skills outlined in Joint Publication 3-57 such as: 
 
Public administration areas such as law enforcement and emergency services, health, labor, legal, 
welfare, finance, and education; areas of economics and commerce such as property control, supply and 
logistics, food and agriculture; public facilities skill areas such as public works and utilities, public 
communications, and public transportation; other functional specialty areas include cultural affairs, civil 
information, and even arts, monuments, and archives (Joint Publication 3-57, p.34). 
 
Referring back to the previous point concerning the range of skills required in this field, and the breadth of 
experience that many reserve soldiers bring to active duty from their civilian jobs, it is apparent that CA 




civilian personnel.  
 
To support the intended mission of a new CM unit, logistical support was determined to 
also include combat troops as well as CMOC Civil Military Operations Center. The 
provision for additional resources would constitute areas in which non-military actors 
would be unable to perform. A key consideration would be the inclusion of a security 
force contingent to secure the selected activities of reservist CA (Civil Affairs) soldiers. 
Further, the selection of determined activities for the selected CA and combat personnel 
reflected the integration of both traditional and specialized military personnel. 
Withstanding either the hostile or stabilized nature respective to the selected area of 
operations under the duress of armed conflict, the combined efforts of CA and combat 
personnel would de-conflict such activities as the coordination of the reconstruction 
effort, the identification of potential projects, village assessments, and the coordination 
of regional activities. 10 
Specific to activities explicitly targeted at development efforts, proposed CM units were 
to be positioned to facilitate the coordination of regional reconstruction activities. In the 
case of Afghanistan, the deployment of CM units would pursue activities to include, but 
                                                 
10 “The following information was presented during the meeting that was attended by several NGO 
representatives, as well as members of the U.S. and U.K. embassies, the UN, ICRC and donors who 
attended to hear the Provisional Joint Regional Team concept as it was called at that time (Stapleton, 
2003, p.15). The teams were to range in size from 50 to 100 people, consisting of CA soldiers, a civil-
military operation center (CMOC) headquarters to coordinate and control reconstruction activities, and a 
security force contingent (i.e. combat troops). The CA soldiers were listed as reservists with a variety of 
backgrounds and skills such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, economists, telecommunications experts, 
and civil aviation professionals. Their stated mission was to: 
 
• Coordinate the reconstruction effort 
• Identify potential projects 
• Conduct village assessments 
• Coordinate activities of those engaged in the reconstruction process such as the NGO’s, the Afghan 




not be limited to, “function as an information sharing node to facilitate information 
sharing”, “facilitate conditions for reconstruction to encourage movement of pledged 
funds”, and to “extend the influence of the Afghan Transitional Authority outside of 
Kabul”. 11 Respective to activities focused on the management and coordination of 
reconstruction, the CM¦ PRT concept would further place CA soldiers whose civilian 
skills extended beyond technical proficiencies, to professional competencies. 
 
Beyond the provision of reserved skills from which the PRT would be able to target 
specified goals, the formation of PRT unit was also meant to support parallel operations 
through indirect influence. 12 In this respect, the selected application of resources would 
bolster influence in the district, province, and region. An additional intent PRT activity 
would be cooperation with local government, in turn further strengthening the legitimacy 
of local and centralized government. In an instance, such as one may be drawn in 
Afghanistan, where the extension and legitimization of centralized government would be 
of critical interest, the appropriate situation of PRTs would anticipate such benefits. 
Secondary effects would also increase the facility of performing military operations 
within the PRTs sphere of influence, should they be necessary. 
                                                 
11 “Military officials also provided an update on the mission and role the teams were expected to play in 
the reconstruction process, which at that time were to: 
 
• Extend the influence of the Afghan Transitional Authority outside of Kabul 
• Expand the work of I-NGO’s and IO’s beyond Kabul 
• Facilitate conditions for reconstruction to encourage movement of pledged funds 
• Function as an information-sharing node to facilitate information sharing (Conference Minutes, 2003, 
pp.5-7).” (p.9 Borders) 
 
12 “In geo-political terms, the PRT’s serve as a point of spreading influence for the central government. 
Metaphorically, their reach will generate concentric circles of influence and at some point those circles will 
meet. However, across Afghanistan, there are different stages of military operations. In some areas active 
pursuit of Al Qaeda continues, in others Phase IV reconstruction operations could be underway. This is 




An identified concession in the deployment and evaluation of CM¦ PRT units is the 
anticipated lack of data regarding unit operations and respective measures of 
performance. The dearth would be attributed to collection requirements, analysis 
requirements, as well as the often classified nature of active military activities. 13 
 
Withstanding the projected lack of data regarding the discreet activities, standards of 
practice, and effectiveness of CM¦ PRT operations, an identified need for the brand of 
units persists. The necessity for CM units primarily point to the potential lack of security 
in areas where NGOs may wish to conduct activities 14, the lack of personnel 
requirements on behalf of non-military actors wishing to pursue activities in hostile 
climates 15, and the prepared state of state actors to assume CM¦ PRT activities au 
courant 16.  
                                                 
13 “Unfortunately this is a new subject and although the teams, in one form or another, have been around 
for over two years there is not a great deal of hard data on the topic available in open source. Currently, 
for example, there are no published studies available to compare differences between two or more 
regions based on the presence or absence of a PRT. It will take some time before this type of data is 
collected, sorted, and in some cases declassified and available for query in open source.” (p.9 Borders) 
 
14 “Those who would continue to argue this point on the basis of idealism should consider two points. 
First, radical extremists don’t respect NGO neutrality or independence any more than they do government 
authority.” (p. 10 Borders) 
 
15 “First, the location for PRT placement is selected on the basis of where NGO’s are currently unable to 
operate and provide services because of the security situation. In addition, the military changed its 
operating procedures and uniform requirements based on input from NGO’s in order to ensure the Afghan 
people can make the distinction.” (p. 10 Borders) 
 
16 “The argument that the military does not have the capacity to engage in humanitarian or civil affairs, 
given the level of technical expertise and skills that the CA soldiers and their interagency counterparts 
bring to the table, is overstated. Even so, the military has taken the advice of the aid community and 
shifted away from the quick impact projects they initially focused on, to larger projects beyond the 





Ultimately, the CM¦ PRT concept has not sought to monopolize conflict interim activities, 
but rather provide a cadre of critical activities under the prepared coverage of state 
actors. The concept is in effect an initial instrument prior to a transition to ISAF forces, 
traditional development efforts, and the self-governance provided for under anticipated 
democratic activity. 17 
 
Speaking to the flexibility and application of the CM¦ PRT concept in Iraq, Borders 
supports the effort through its conception, application in Afghanistan, as well as its 
potential for use in the Iraqi theatre of operations.  
 
“The PRT concept currently employed in Afghanistan has proven to be a flexible model 
for post-conflict reconstruction that the United States and its allies have endorsed and to 
which they remain committed. PRT’s are a unique blend of development and security, 
and are the result of an evolutionary process that continues to date. The fact that it is 
still a work-in-progress should encourage those who oppose it in principle to engage the 
CM community and influence its future development to ensure all stakeholder interests, 
concerns, and mutually shared objectives are acknowledged and incorporated into the 
model. This last point is especially pertinent given the current reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq and the potential for applying the PRT model there as well. 
 
As the security situation in Iraq stabilizes and the priority of effort shifts back towards 
reconstruction, development, and civil governance functions, some form of the PRT 
model and lessons learned from Afghanistan will undoubtedly be employed to facilitate 
those efforts. As transition of power from the occupying Coalition Provisional Authority 
                                                 
17 “The PRT’s in concert with regular security forces are designed to create the conditions for 
“humanitarian space” in order to facilitate the efforts of NGO’s, not remove them from the equation. In 
short, the PRT concept is designed to provide the tactical and operational bridge necessary to implement 
the strategic goal of a gradual transition of functions and authority from the Coalition to the interim Afghan 




to an interim Iraqi government authority occurs, and the new Iraqi government seeks to 
provide critical services for its citizens, the PRT’s can play an important role in 
facilitating that process. They must play a role because the teams are one proven tool in 
a post-war environment where the kit bag of options is unfortunately limited given the 
difficult post-war paradox of providing security on the one hand, and critical aid and 
development on the other. There are no easy answers, but there is hope and 








                                                 
18 “The PRT concept currently employed in Afghanistan has proven to be a flexible model for post-conflict 
reconstruction that the United States and its allies have endorsed and to which they remain committed. 
PRT’s are a unique blend of development and security, and are the result of an evolutionary process that 
continues to date. The fact that it is still a work-in-progress should encourage those who oppose it in 
principle to engage the CM community and influence its future development to ensure all stakeholder 
interests, concerns, and mutually shared objectives are acknowledged and incorporated into the model. 
This last point is especially pertinent given the current reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the potential for 
applying the PRT model there as well. 
 
As the security situation in Iraq stabilizes and the priority of effort shifts back towards reconstruction, 
development, and civil governance functions, some form of the PRT model and lessons learned from 
Afghanistan will undoubtedly be employed to facilitate those efforts. As transition of power from the 
occupying Coalition Provisional Authority to an interim Iraqi government authority occurs, and the new 
Iraqi government seeks to provide critical services for its citizens, the PRT’s can play an important role in 
facilitating that process. They must play a role because the teams are one proven tool in a post-war 
environment where the kit bag of options is unfortunately limited given the difficult post-war paradox of 
providing security on the one hand, and critical aid and development on the other. There are no easy 
answers, but there is hope and opportunity for the future. The PRT’s are a part of the solution, not the 





The selected research methodology will focus on the selection of qualitative data drawn 
from secondary sources which have sought to, comprehensively, identify the scope of 
PRT operations and their potential to identify best practices for PRT operations. 
 
Prior to the design of a research methodology, based on the extent to which the 
research question may address, the development of a datum model is necessary to 
identify the limits of relevant datum. The identification of relevant datum will also serve 
to guide and narrow the selection of source material for the purposes of datum 
extraction.    
 
A projected, sample, model is defined below, it targets the likely areas from which 







































































An initial step in the research design is the clear identification of the research question, 
as stated above and below: 
 
What have been the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission 
of ‘capacity development’? 
 
The second step is the collection of source material. These may be reports as produced 
by, but not limited to: 
 
Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
Center for Army Lessons Learned 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services ¦ U.S. 
House of Representatives 
Journal of Development and Social Transformation 
Strategic Studies Institute ¦ United States Army 
National Security Research Division ¦ RAND Corporation 
Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction ¦ United States 
Department of State 
United States Department of Defense 
Commission of Wartime Contracting 
Senate Committee for Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 
 
From the, ultimately, selected sources, the extraction of qualitative datum will then 
occur, identifying (available) pieces of information that help to define the scope of 
operations, such as: 
 
x What is a PRT? 
x What are the personnel types present in the PRT? 
x Are the personnel SME, federal, or military? 
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x What is the personnel mix within the PRT? 
x What is the balance between present personnel types? 
x What skills are present amongst the PRT personnel? 
x What is the range of skills present in the PRT, respective to PRT missions? 
 
x What does a PRT do? 
x What operations are common to occur within a PRT? 
x Do the operations reflect political, social, or economic ends? 
x What are sample durations of operations conducted by a PRT? 
x Are operation lengths an exception or a rule? 
x What are the stated goals of sample PRT operations? 
x Do operation specific goals reflect mission goals? 
x What are the common operational costs to PRT operations? 
x How clear are costs identified in PRT operations? 
 
x How does a PRT accomplish its mission? 
x What is the leadership structure of a PRT? 
x Is the given model of leadership the standard among PRTs? 
x How do PRTs manage the planning, delivery, and execution of aid? 
x Is the execution of aid done within the PRT or externally (contractors)? 
x How does a PRT manage its available resources? 
x How does a PRT manage its human capital and material resources? 
 
The identification of the aforementioned level of detail will then allow a comparative 
analysis of the collected sources and their respective datum. The clear identification of 
datum form the selected sources would demonstrate where information gaps exist in the 
review and reporting of PRT operations. Respective to the policy interests of the 
researching organization, parallels may or may not appear to be drawn between the 




In turn, efficacies and shortcomings will be read from the analysis of collected data ¦ 
sources, withstanding any information gaps that may appear from any singular source. 
The final step is the here identified best practices, regarding the mission, structure, and 
operations of PRTs. The, then, comparison of cumulative best practices, against the 
guidance of the individual selection of sources will address the capabilities of existing 
research to comprehensively identify the scope of PRT operations and the potential to 
identify best practices for PRT operations. 
 




























Mission Structure Operations 
Suggested Areas of Focus 
Meta Analysis 




What is a PRT? 
- Personnel Type 
- Personnel Mix 
- Personnel Skills 
What does a PRT do? 
- Operation Mix 
- Operation Length 
- Operation Goals 





Application of Data Collection Method 
Data Sources 




Because the research design will be document based, it will focus on secondary 
sources. It is this collection of evidence that will support discovery meant to address the 
research question. These secondary resources will be extant published documents 
regarding PRT operations in Iraq. The organizations from which secondary sources will 
be drawn have made their reports regarding PRT operations in Iraq publicly available. 
The resources will not require special permissions to become accessible. 
 
In addition, the selected process will not require interviews with key actors and 
stakeholders. The explicit use of secondary sources, although, will not directly exclude 
key data made available through actors and stakeholders, as many of the publicly 
available secondary resources are records of congressional testimony and interviews.  
 
The geographic scale of the research design has also been limited to data discussed in 
regards to PRT operations in Iraq, although research regarding PRT activity extends to 
both recent theaters of PRT operations, including Afghanistan. The unique selection of 
research regarding Iraq will allow for the exclusion of social, economic, and political 
factors exclusive to PRTs in Afghanistan. 
 
The selected method of data analysis will focus on qualitative data and the development 
of qualitative data from secondary sources. The method will rely on the analysis of 
content included therein, the extracted datum, and the development of qualitative 
measures to allow for the meta-analysis of the qualitative datum. The selected method 
analysis best addresses the research question, which aims to identify and qualify the 
competence in methods of review of PRT operations.  
 
The schedule for the selected course of research will be representative of several 
stages. The stages will include data collection, data selection, and data analysis. The 
period of data collection will focus on the collection of, publicly available, secondary 
resources from pertinent authors and research organizations, concerning the 
deployment and performance of PRTs in Iraq. The period of data selection will focus on 
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the detailed review of selected resources. As the method of data analysis will focus on 
the development of qualitative measures from the selected secondary sources, the 
following stages will be dependent on the thorough execution of the data selection 
phase. The terminal stage in the research schedule, data analysis, will perform 




























Selected Qualitative Data 
 
Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq 
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
SIG-06-034 
Sunday 29 October 2006 
 
As of October 2006, the Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has 
reported on the status of the PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team program in Iraq, 
through SIG-06-34. 
 
The absence of the Hussein regime had one effect, to which the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team has sought to address, the opportunity of “… empowering 
inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services.” 
19 As a reaction to the vacuum and decentralization of power, National Security 
Presidential Directives 36 and 44, issued 11 May 2004 and 07 December 2005 
respectively, allowed for the theoretical development of CM civilian military units tasked 
to increase Iraqi capacity at the local level. 20 The effects of quickly targeting the 
decentralized governmental elements of a free Iraq would strengthen municipal 
governments, communities, and the likelihood of democratic processes in the currently 
fragile state.  
 
To perform the tasks of capacity development, civilian agency personnel and military 
personnel would compose CM civilian ¦ military units, to assist in the development of 
                                                 
19 “The decentralization of authority that the Coalition Provisional Authority initiated following the fall of 
Saddam Hussein's regime had the effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the 
delivery of provincial government services.” (p. I SIG-06-034) 
 
20 “National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44 provided the policy and organizational framework 




governmental capacity to independently perform economic affairs, political autonomy, 
and infrastructure development. 21 Although the intent of operations would target 
several, key, areas of municipal interest, the selected term of art for the goal and 
measure of operations would be ‘capacity development’. 22 
 
It is important to note audit SIG-06-034, although a measure of the PRT Provincial 
Reconstruction Team program in Iraq, was not meant to identify the performance 
measures which rate the effectiveness of PRT efforts. Rather, the audit is an 
identification of the capabilities and obstacles PRTs have encountered in the initial year 
of operations. 23 A key element of the assessment to consider was whether participating 
agencies had the capacity to effectively coordinate their programs, deployments, and 
operations. 24 
 
In identifying the particular requirements of each PRT, the unique political climate of the 
individual provinces would determine the specifications of the assigned PRT, respective 
to size, location, and operations. 25 The schedule of PRT operations would persist in the 
                                                 
21 “Integrated and multidisciplinary teams composed of U.S. civilian and military personnel and locally 
employed Iraqi staff were to train, coach, and mentor provincial governments in core competencies of 
governance, economic development, rule of law, and infrastructure development. This audit report 
examines the status of the PRT Program in Iraq.” (pp. i¦ii SIG-06-034) 
 
22 “Though referred to under the umbrella term reconstruction, the initiative’s primary purpose is capacity 
development.” (p. 1 SIG-06-034) 
 
23 “This report did not assess the performance of the PRTs̶only the ability of the PRTs to meet the 
mission. We intend to assess the performance of the PRTs during 2007.” (p. ii SIG-06-034) 
 
24 Are participating organizations effectively coordinating their programs and operational support? (p. ii 
SIG-06-034) 
 
25 PRT staffing is dependent on the needs and circumstances of the individual province. A team may 




designated area of operations toward a period until which the capacity of local 
government expresses operational autonomy, sufficient enough to continue under the 
umbrella of traditional development aid. 26 
 
Summarily, SIG-06-034 identifies the initial achievements in the rapid development of 
the CM units, but stresses to identify the difficulty of performing development efforts in 
the conflict interim environs in which Iraq persists. The threats to the PRT mission faced 
through the logistical coordination of multiple agencies, the integration of civilian and 
military personnel, and the array of security threats on behalf of anti-coalitions forces, 
have all presented unique challenges to the execution of PRT operations. 27 In an early 
challenge, respective to personnel, SIG-06-034 identifies the difficulty in the DoS 
staffing of civilian positions. 28 The result and one which bore critically on the early 
performance of PRTs was the staffing of civilian vacancies with DoD CA civil affairs 
personnel. As a consequence, many of the critical skills required within the civilian 
positions were supplanted with the alternate set of expertise possessed by civil affairs 
personnel. 
 
To confront the broad range of challenges faced in the deployment and operation of 
                                                 
26 During the first two years, the PRTs are to support provincial government capacity development. As the 
provincial governments demonstrate increased capability to govern and manage their security 
environment, thereby reducing the role of coalition forces in the provinces, then each PRT would 
transition to a traditional USAID training program to develop local governance capacity for the remaining 
two years. (p. 2 SIG-06-034) 
 
27 Many obstacles have been overcome, but many remain, such as the ever-changing security situation, 
the difficulty of integrating civilian and military personnel, the lack of a finalized agreement on PRT 
operational requirements and responsibilities, a lag in funding resources, and the difficulty in recruiting 
and retaining qualified civilian personnel. (p. ii SIG-06-034) 
 
28 We also noted that when DoS had difficulty filling many civilian positions, DoD filled the gap by 




PRTs, SIGIR-06-034 has also developed a series of recommendations as of the 
publication of the audit.  
 
Following is a series of key areas of interest within SIGIR-06-034. 
 
Security & Constraints 
 
Limitations to the security of CM personnel and operations play a pivotal role in the 
assessment of PRTs by SIGIR-06-034. Because the capability of personnel to engage 
in expected lines of business, provincial activities, as well as engagement with local 
stakeholders determines the success of the PRT mission, establishing a stable AOR 
area of operations is critical to that success. 29 
 
A key identification of the audit is the requirement of PRT personnel to regularly interact 
with Iraqi stakeholders to successfully meet the mission requirement of capacity 
development. 30 Though given the existing security climate, a key obstacle in the pursuit 
of PRT activities has been the existing threats of meeting openly with Iraqi stakeholders 
by anti-coalition forces. The result has been the opinion of the audit that insufficient 
contact has occurred to meet mission requirements as of 2006. 31  
                                                 
29 The unstable security environment in Iraq touches every aspect of the PRT mission. Because of 
security concerns, face-to-face meetings between provincial government officials and PRT personnel are 
often limited and, in some cases, do not occur. PRT members are at particular risk when traveling to and 
from their engagements with their Iraqi counterparts, as are provincial government officials and local Iraqi 
staff working with the PRT. (p. 5 SIG-06-034) 
 
30 The PRT Program’s effectiveness depends on regular interaction of PRT members with local Iraqis in 
their respective seats of government. (p. 5 SIG-06-034) 
 
31 Many of the PRT members we interviewed believed that they had insufficient contact with their Iraqi 
counterparts. When security concerns prevented face-to-face meetings, they used email and cell phones 





The threat, to the initial line of operations, also extends to succeeding linkages in the 
PRT goal of increasing local capacity, in respect to economic development, population 
security, and infrastructure. As of 2006, the existing security climate also precluded a 
number of investments in local Iraqi capacity on behalf of international actors. 32  
 
Additional security constraints have been experienced on meeting the mission 
requirement of capacity development in the form of obstacles to community 
engagement. The result has required the ingenuity of PRT personnel to conduct their 
lines of business according to alternate methods, clandestinely, or not at all. One such 
example has been the meeting of PRT and government officials outside of the province 
and AOR area of operations where the PRT was meant to conduct activities. 33 
 
These initial obstacles have led to the fortification of ground transport, requiring armored 
vehicles as well as armed personnel, i.e. “shooters”. 34 The exposure and threats to 
personnel has also restricted US PRT personnel to rely on transport provided by US 
personnel, negating available transport of coalition partners similarly engaged in the 
PRT effort. 35 
 
                                                 
32 A key objective of the PRTs is economic development and job creation, with a focus on encouraging 
increased engagement by Iraqis with the international business community. (p. 5 SIG-06-034) 
 
33 Also, according to USAID officials, training programs to develop local governance capacity for Anbar, 
Salah ad Din, and Diyala provincial government officials are often conducted outside the respective 
provinces because of security concerns. (p. 6 SIG-06-034) 
 
34 Movement requirements include a minimum of three armored vehicles and eight “shooters” trained in 
protection duties. (p. 6 SIG-06-034) 
 
35 The U.S. Embassy ruled that movement security provided by coalition partners did not meet U.S. 




As of August 2006, during a one week period in August, anti-coalition forces employed 
the use of IED improvised explosive devices against three separate PRT based at 
Salah ad Din. 36 Due to the increased fragility of ground transport and threats to 
personnel, SIGIR-06-034 has identified the increased use of air transport for personnel 
carrying out PRT activities in several provinces. 37 
 
Security remains a key threat to the success of the PRT mission, as mitigating the 
overall exposure of PRT personnel and activities remains a key concern as of 
September 2006. 38 The current security, as of the production of the audit, not only 
remained a concern, the security of the province beyond the tenure of PRT activity, as 




Within a year of the commencement of initial PRT operations, one issue to quickly arise 
was the delegation of operational costs respective to PRT activity. As determined 
through the MNF-I Multi National Force ¦ Iraq, DoS was delegated the core 
responsibilities of the execution of duties and ostensibly the financing of PRTs. Further, 
an initial ruling, on behalf of the MNF-I, identified the limited role DoD would assume in 
meeting the operational and maintenance costs of PRT activity. 39 
                                                 
36 For example, during a seven-day period in mid-August, explosive devices hit three different convoys 
carrying Salah ad Din PRT members en route to meetings with provincial officials. (p. 7 SIG-06-034) 
 
37 In addition, because of the increased threat to U.S. personnel in the south central region of Iraq, travel 
by civilian PRT members to several provinces in the region now takes place primarily by air. (p. 7 SIG-06-
034) 
 
38 U.S. Embassy security officials also told us that they were concerned about the overall physical safety 
of unarmed civilian PRT members because of their exposed state when interacting with provincial 
government officials. (p. 7 SIG-06-034) 
 




The special function of the identifying the ruling, although the audit does not apply 
evaluative measures to efficiency of appropriated monies pursuant to PRT activities, is 
to demonstrate the initial limitations and lack of flexibility in the operational coordination 
of PRTs as early as 2005. Although delays in operations were eventually resolved, the 
initial constraints regarding funding prove for one example regarding the critical 
importance of allowing for flexibility in shared CM unit development, on behalf of civilian 
and military actors. 
 
The constraints experienced by PRT operations and civilian ¦ military coordination were 
not only determined by the delegation of authorities as determined by MNF-I, but also a 
lack of executive cooperation between DoS and DoD, as related to specifications 
respective to the PRT mission. The lack of an initial agreement between civilian and 
military leadership precluded the absence of specifics such as, but not limited to, 
facilities, life support, communications, management services, and supplies. 40 
 
Doctrine and Leadership 
 
Beyond the assertion that the initial limitations of PRT activity were foundational and 
coordinative, SIGIR-06-034 further speaks to the limited, if key, complications of civilian 
and military integration. The audit draws focus on the challenges experienced by DoS ¦ 
DoD as related to doctrine and leadership. 
                                                                                                                                                             
mission and that DoD operations and maintenance funds could not be used to support PRTs. (p. 8 SIG-
06-034) 
 
40 The lack of an overall memorandum of agreement had serious ramifications. The lines of authority and 
coordination between U.S. Embassy and military components were never spelled out and agreed upon, 
and the operational support mechanisms the PRTs are dependent upon at military bases̶i.e. facilities, 






One such challenge was the integration of civilian and military personnel. 41 Although 
the intent of a number of National Security Presidential Directives and Defense 
Directives was to determine the concept of operations regarding the mission of CM 
units, the policy documents summarily omit the finite identification of personnel 
selection, coordination, and organizational collaboration. CM units, although discussed 
on several occasions as directed by civilian personnel withstanding an equal 
partnership in military integration and support, would only meet the challenges specific 
to an absence of explicit legal provision for the direction of DoD personnel by civilian 
authority. 42  
 
The challenges of civilian and military integration not only extended the formal 
coordination of personnel, but also to the, inevitable, stove piping experienced as the 
result of integrating organizations whose institutional behavior could be as indoctrinate 
as with DoS and DoD. SIGIR-06-034 cites one example, although also a consequence 
of the constraints regarding civilian staffing, wherein “…commanders viewed capacity 
development in provincial governments as too vague a mission. For example, in Anbar 
province, the military commander did not support the PRT mission, would not provide 
resources, such as transportation, and excluded PRT members from attending 
                                                 
41 Both DoS and DoD face the challenge of integrating their operations and organizational cultures to 
enable their civilian and military personnel to work jointly. (p. 8 SIG-06-034) 
 
42 Thus, without specific operational guidance and delegation of authorities in accordance with Title 10 of 
the U.S. Code, they are restricted from supporting the PRT mission. These officers explained that Title 10 
gives the Secretary of Defense authority, direction, and control over DoD and that a specific delegation of 
authority is required for military personnel to fall under DoS operational control.6 But DoS officials said 
that it was never intended for civilian team leaders to exercise command authority over the military forces 
assigned to the PRT; the civilian PRT team leader only has supervisory authority to direct the local 
activities of those forces. We believe that Defense Directive 3000.05 allows civilian-military PRT teams. 
Thus, we believe additional clarification on the use and management of joint civilian military PRTs is 








As of 2006, in addition to assessments regarding the execution of PRT activity, 
operational capability similarly has been a subject of review of SIGIR-06-034. An initial 
constraint regarding operational capability, also reflected as a tenet of CM coordination, 
was the lack of a provision for an MOA regarding the logistical support of PRTs between 
DoS and DoD. 44 
 
Although this provision, or there a lack of, would detail such coordinative CM issues 
such as PRT infrastructure, facilities, and logistics, it would also have been benefit to 
identify the base operational capability of a PRT. In several cases, PRT activity, as of 
2006, remained severely constrained as a result of lack of access to basic 
administrative supplies and services. 45 Although this limitation stemmed from an initial 
lack of funding and supplies, its negative bearing on operational capability becomes 
critical in both an environment where a baseline operational capability is not established 
                                                 
43 Yet other commanders viewed capacity development in provincial governments as too vague a 
mission. For example, in Anbar province, the military commander did not support the PRT mission, would 
not provide resources, such as transportation, and excluded PRT members from attending meetings with 
other government officials. (p. 10 SIGIR-06-034) 
 
44 The lack of a DoS-DoD memorandum of agreement is a major impediment to smooth PRT operations, 
as evidenced in the uneven infrastructure and logistical support for PRTs located at the military’s forward-
operating bases. (p. 12 SIG-06-034) 
 
45 During visits to the PRTs at Ninawa, Ta’mim, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, we catalogued recurring 
support problems. These include inadequate office space; limited phones, computers, printers, copiers, 
internet access, and information technology support; and shortages of such basic office supplies as 




and PRT activity occurs prior to meeting the predetermined capability. 46 
 
As a result, methods of improvisation would become common to satisfice the 
operational capability of PRTs, regarding even the provision for items such as office 
supplies. 47 Further, there existed a broad consensus amongst PRT leadership, as of 
2006, that baseline support regarding infrastructure, logistics, and resources should be 




The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction sheds a particular 
light on human capital resources early in the development of Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams. The early conditions of PRT staffing are of importance as the long term effects 
of personnel selection defined the CM units future opportunities and constraints. 
 
Irrespective to the implicit difficulties of humanitarian organizations conducting relief 
within conflict interim environments, PRTs experienced early the bottlenecks of 
developing operations in areas of need. SIGIR-06-034 identifies the challenge faced by 
DoS in attracting internal personnel to staff positions where civilian expertise remained 
a requisite. 49 One contributing factor was the inherent danger, whether perceived or 
                                                 
46 The PRTs lacked funding and logistical supply resources. (p. 12 SIG-06-034) 
 
47 PRT members stressed that obtaining office items was a continuous problem. Their only recourse as to 
use personal funds to purchase office supplies at the base exchange. (p. 12 SIG-06-034) 
 
48 The consensus among the interviewed PRT leaders was that no PRT should be started until the 
requisite operational and infrastructure support were in place. (p. 12 SIG-06-034) 
 
49 DoS’s inability to attract qualified civilians to fill positions in Baghdad has been a continuous challenge 
throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Attracting civilians to serve at the PRTs in austere and 




real, in conducting operations in the concurrent theater of war, Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Such core civilian positions that largely remained unstaffed as of 2006 in many PRTs 
were the rule of law, political officer, and program manager positions. 50 
 
In 2006, the resulting dearth of staffed civilian positions led to the DoD asserting the role 
of staffing vacancies, whether administrative or professional in nature, with CA 
personnel. 51 The effects of staffing open positions with DoD personnel, although 
clearing constraints as related to a lack of personnel, allowed for a new set of limitations 
as implicit in charging CA personnel with economic, agricultural, and governmental 
advisory roles. As early as 2006, SIGIR-06-034 identifies the difficulties with the 
aforementioned action, as it maintains an absence of professional skillsets and 
expertise that would be further possessed through the careful selection of civilian 
personnel. 52 
 
As a corrective measure, as of the publication of SIGIR-06-034, the audit has suggested 
the preemptive development of skill set requirements of civilian positions to best 
position the DoD in the conditional staffing of civilian positions with CA personnel. 53 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
                                                 
50 Although we could not obtain staffing data for this period, NCT personnel reported that they were 
unable to fill many core PRT positions̶rule of law, political officer, and program manager. (p. 15 SIG-06-
034) 
 
51 To compensate for the lack of civilians, DoD stepped up and provided numerous military civil affairs 
personnel to fill the void for many of the vacant PRT Program positions. (p. 15 SIG-06-034) 
 
52 The military infusion of personnel enabled the PRTs to function, but many personnel did not possess 
the full range of needed skills. (p. 15 SIG-06-034) 
 
53 However, we believe specifying skills set requirements would allow the military to better identify, train, 





The audit concludes through an identification of the demonstrated and future potential of 
the PRT program in Iraq to perform capacity development at the provincial level. The 
identified achievements have been met through the flexibility of personnel to operate in 
conditions fraught with setbacks, delays, and shortfalls. 54 The process, although, is 
admittedly complicated by challenges, threats, and weaknesses in the program. 55 
 
Systematic improvements to the program which would have a bare a comprehensive 
impact on operational capability include increased communication between civilian and 
military agencies, the development of long term comprehensive operational plans, and 
the further development of procedures respective to human capital resources. 56 57 58 
 
                                                 
54 On balance, the PRT experience in Iraq demonstrates individual successes arising from individual 
efforts and improvisations, which allowed some PRTs to move forward with their capacity-development 
mission. (p. 17 SIG-06-034) 
 
55 The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq provides the best opportunity for U.S. government 
experts to provide grassroots support in the development of local governance capacity in Iraq. Despite 
very difficult operating conditions, creating the PRTs in the short a period of time is a noteworthy 
achievement and was directly related to effective senior leadership at the Iraq Reconstruction 
Management Office and to the Commanding General, MNC-I. Complicating the U.S.-led PRT program 
are the lingering issues concerning the PRT mission and civilian-military integration, which, in part, have 
led to set-backs, operational delays, and resource shortfalls. (p. 18 SIG-06-034) 
 
56 Similarly, executing an effective PRT Program in Iraq would have been greatly enhanced if DoS and 
DoD shared a common understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities. (p. 17 SIG-06-034) 
 
57 3. Develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the PRTs, including clearly defined objectives 
and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; future funding requirements; and 
a strategy for sustaining results and successfully transitioning the program to USAID.(p. 18 SIG-06-034) 
 
58 6. Specify-skill set requirements for civil affairs personnel at PRTs to enable better training, selection, 




Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices 
National Security Research Division ¦ RAND 
2008 
 
The NSRD (National Security Research Division) at RAND (Research and 
Development) Corporation, in the secondary stages of discovery regarding PRTs, prior 
to 2008, draw focus on PRTs as essentially militarized security activities which have 
been tasked to perform civilian operations. In response to interests such as, what are 
key questions regarding PRTs and what remains unknown regarding the nature of their 
activities, NSRD RAND summarily identifies their purpose as shoring the theater's 
stability for conventional military operations. NSRD continues to identify 
recommendations in light of these considerations. 59 
 
The PRT workforce composition identified by NSRD RAND relies on the foundation 
provided by military personnel. The focus drawn on security alludes the difficulty of the 
PRTs that would be then composed of primarily civilian personnel, in action and 
engagement with local populations. The estimation drawn by NSRD RAND also 
assumes that security might not only become a requirement to ensure the safety of 
civilian personnel, but also a mechanism necessary to provide security to the participant 
population from its own embedded insurgency. 60 
 
NSRD RAND does not go as far to identify sample compositions of PRT personnel as 
                                                 
59 Typically, a PRT consists of a joint civil-military leadership group representing the Department of State, 
USAID, and DoD, supported by a core unit of military security providers that defend the PRT itself, if 
needed, and help provide limited protection for local populations prepared to work with the PRT or the 
broader Operation Iraqi Freedom or ISAF mission. (p.33 RAND) 
 
60 Amalgamated with the PRT are experts and specialists, some military, some nonmilitary, whose role 
according to this view is to work effectively with the local leadership and populations in a wide range of 
activities that can include mentoring local government officials, gathering intelligence, building mutually 
trusting relationships, meeting some of the basic needs of local populations, and serving as cadre 
elements for more-ambitious construction, infrastructure, and other nation-building projects. (p.33 RAND) 
52 
 
well as their quantity. This element, is although necessary to identify the shortcomings 
of PRT activity. The effectiveness described therein, regarding municipal level activities 
such as local political development, basic social services, and infrastructure 
improvements, depends on the ability of personnel to perform under an expressed 
knowledge of regional and subject matter expertise. Although, military personnel may 
express a cadre of knowledge, it is the inclusion of civilian personnel placed therein for 
the purpose of facilitating activities specific to their expertise respective to an 
appropriate chain of command that may transform the security apparatus to one 
focused reconstruction and development. It does not appear from the assessment 
produced by NSRD RAND, which also fails to identify the sample models of command 
and leadership in PRTs. 
 
NSRD RAND further categorically seats PRTs under the efforts of counterinsurgency 
and not within the scope of reconstruction. As evident in years of written 
counterinsurgency doctrine, the winning of hearts and minds is a contrast to coercion, 
which lies on the opposite end of doctrine. The tactics of coercion, which NSRD RAND 
does not go so far to identify as the vehicle of counterinsurgency which PRTs may 
provide, is primarily a show of military force meant to suppress insurgent activity 
through pervasive military action. As made evident through current counterinsurgency 
doctrine and ongoing military operations, coercion is neither a tactic that has seen 
recently deployment or seen as one effective in countering Iraqi insurgency activity. 61 
 
It can then be interpreted that the PRT is a vehicle whom deploys diplomatic efforts to 
include, social services, light infrastructure, and local security, as tools in support of 
larger diplomatic goals. This is also true of many counterinsurgency efforts. It does not 
point to the deployment of PRTs as a method of traditional development goals, outside 
and after the cessation of military activities. Activities and services that occur under a 
                                                 
61 The PRT is at the center of efforts to gain the support of the population’s hearts and minds for its 




PRT, then can be understood in service of military goals such as stabilization and 
peace. 
 
NSRD RAND has also clearly identified the primarily military composition of PRTs. Yet, 
their allusion to the moire appearance of civilian ¦ military distinctions and the likelihood 
that the pursuit of civilian tasks has been assumed by the military personnel within the 
PRT has all but been assured through earlier estimations of personnel composition. 62 
 
The NSRD RAND assessment on population security comes to identify the difficulty that 
a reconstruction component composed primarily of civilian personnel would have 
performing PRT functions without military security. In this assessment, their security 
would be become a perennial issue, at both the site of operations and their stay. 
Although, the assessment that PRTs would be a successful tool in the absence of an 
insurgency is of limited value, as PRTs are primarily composed, in terms of 
percentages, of military personnel. The caveat that PRTs also operate from FOBs all 
but dictates that the PRT will be operating in an area with some level of insurgent 
activity. In this environment, the conclusion that can be drawn from NSRD RAND it 
would be necessary for PRTs to live and travel within a conventional military construct. 
63 
 
The assessment made by NSRD RAND also identifies the complications in previously 
being able to address the skills necessary to effectively accomplish mission objectives 
held by the PRT. The assessment also speaks to the difficulty of cooperation regarding 
the execution of operational tasks, managing resources, and maintaining balance 
                                                 
62 Another view is that PRTs amount to a militarization of civilian tasks and have led to a blurring of the 
distinction between political-military and humanitarian objectives. (p.33 RAND) 
 
63 If an insurgency has already taken root, then the PRT model gains credence as a useful tool. If it has 
not̶according to this view̶then the military should focus on creating enough ambient security so that 




between military and civilian personnel. It is also this difficulty which would be 
experienced in establishing a clear chain of command between civilian and military 
personnel, again regarding resources, planning, and execution. The allusion to 
executing mission objectives through the process of trial and error speaks to the 
disconnect between the planning stages and the end result of PRT activity. 64 
 
What is established through the earlier findings of NSRD RAND is the primarily military 
composition of PRTs and their ability to militarize civilian tasks. What is missing is an 
assessment of the discreet PRTs ability to perform diplomatic tasks, as a primarily 
military apparatus. This estimation, again, and the success thereof, would require the 
availability of skills requisite to nation building in respect to experience with transitional 
governmental organizations. It is unclear whether PRTs, as they have been composed, 
are capable of addressing these matters at the municipal level.  65 
 
The further recommendations of NSRD RAND, requesting the establishment of 
guidelines for PRT creation and activity at the Department of State falls short of 
suggesting models outright. The further suggestion of best practices, to include regional 
training, does not address at the personnel level, what resources would become 
necessary to accomplish stated goals. 66 
 
It is possible these estimations are exactly that, given the aforementioned nature of 
                                                 
64 The best decisions regarding the best combination of tasks to be performed, skills to be deployed, 
balance to be struck between military and non- military personnel, and size and resources of a PRT will 
be made by those on the ground, often as the result of trial and error. (p.34 RAND) 
 
65 The activities of PRTs need to be fully transparent to the host government and conducted in 
cooperation with it. Indeed, much of the benefits gained through a PRT effort, however successful in the 
short term, may be lost if the host nation’s leadership is not engaged in the process and does not 
experience direct benefit. This process can be aided by continuity in foreign personnel. (p.34 RAND) 
 
66 DoD, the Department of State, and USAID need jointly to develop clear and precise doctrine about the 
missions, structure, operations, and activities of a PRT or similar civil-military model. (p.35 RAND) 
55 
 
inquiry regarding state sponsored activities abroad. At no point, is the operational 
picture and the extent of situational awareness under which NSRD RAND has 
performed the study is indicated.  
 
In respect to the literature review itself, and the extent in which research of PRTs has 
occurred, as organized by the state and as pursued by varying interests, given the area 
of study, it becomes necessary to further review such as congressional testimony and 
interagency assessments. As stated, the pursuit would demonstrate the absence where 
further research is necessary, if performed against the framework of existing research. 
This would be fulfilled through the comparative analysis of existing research, wherein 
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In addition to the commonly identified function of PRT activity as a joint civilian military 
function, meant to increase local provincial capacity and function, CALL ¦ Center for 
Army Lessons Learned further identifies the concept of operations, operational 
guidance, and implementation respective to existing activities, as of 2008.  
 
Concept of Operations 
 
Unique to PRT operations, as identified by CALL, is the climate in which the CM units 
are meant to operate. PRTs should demonstrate the ability to perform operations within 
a vacuum of power, resources, and internal stability. In effect, they are meant to occupy 
and subsequently leverage their own resources, as well as local resources, to eliminate 
the vacuum of instability. 67  
 
The mitigation of instability shall be met with program activities which facilitate 
reconstruction. Reconstruction, although, does not simply speak to the support of 
physical planning activities as well as the development of infrastructure. As identified by 
CALL, the provision of basic services, supporting economic activity, as well assuring the 
integration of local government were functions meant to facilitate stability and 
reconstruction. 68 An additional element of the PRT mission is to increase the 
                                                 
67 PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and hence 
deter agents of instability. The PRT focuses on three elements of stabilization and reconstruction. (p. 5 
CALL) 
 
68 Facilitates reconstruction that begins to: 
Provide basic services. 
57 
 
developmental capacity of the host nation, to allow for international efforts to succeed 
within traditional development efforts. 69 
 
In respect to personnel, PRT operations should require an appropriate number of 
civilian personnel equipped with the core competencies to address stabilization, 
reconstruction, and development. 70 The personnel mix, although, will ultimately depend 
on the particular nature of the AOR and the operation types necessary to increase 
stability in the province. 71 Because of the unique personnel compositions which may 
exist amongst PRTs, the CM units are positioned to deliver a comprehensive conflict 




                                                                                                                                                             
Provide an economic system that supports the people. 
Gain popular buy-in for change and support of the representative government. 
Ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated. (p. 5 CALL) 
 
69 The PRT’s role is to ensure international efforts are in line with the host nation’s development intentions 
and, in doing so, assess and, if possible, mitigate the constraints to development. (p. 5 CALL) 
 
70 This evolution in execution of the PRT mission requires a change in focus and an increased number of 
civilians with core competencies to address the development aspects of stabilization and reconstruction. 
(p. 6 CALL) 
 
71 Operations are dynamic and may not progress in a linear manner. Different parts of a country may 
require different combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to transition from violent 
conflict toward stability and ultimately to peace. (p. 7 CALL) 
 
72 Because of the combined capabilities of the diplomacy, military, and development components, PRTs 
are able to stabilize these areas. When the capabilities brought by the military component of the PRT are 
no longer needed, the military component can withdraw, and the diplomatic and development 




In respect to the cost, the CALL identifies the prohibitive nature of conducting PRT 
operations when done so inefficiently. Limiting the unnecessary use of personnel, 
equipment, and logistical services should be considered in conducting operations. Due 
to the high costs associated with extraneous PRT activity, it remains imperative that 
PRT activities solely focus on meeting mission requirements and avoiding measures 




The initial intent upon the establishment of a PRT should be the assessment of local 
centers of power as well as the needs of the local community. The ability to identify the 
former will assist the PRT in the further determination of the issues with which it should 
be tasked, as well as the challenges it will face in conducting operations. 74 One critical 
element of the assessment should be the time frames by which the PRT may 
reasonable expect to conduct activities, the expected tenure of the PRT itself, as well as 




                                                 
73 PRTs are extremely expensive in terms of personnel, maintenance, and activity costs. Therefore, it is 
incumbent on the embassy country team, military chain of command, troop-contributing nations, 
participating agencies, and PRT leadership teams to keep PRTs focused on their ultimate goal and avoid 
all activities that do not directly contribute to accomplishing their mission. (p. 7 CALL) 
 
74 Once the PRT is established, the leadership must gain access to local power centers and assess the 
environment to determine the issues the PRT should address, as well as the challenges and obstacles 
impacting on these issues. (p. 8 CALL) 
 
75 The PRT develops an implementation plan guided by the provincial stability strategy, based on a 
realistic time frame, for the anticipated tenure of the PRT and the dynamics of the area of responsibility 




Although a PRT is not identified as a standalone development institution, CALL 
suggests the principle by which the units may be most effective is to function as though 
they were. The process by which a PRT should assume and devolve responsibilities 
within their AOR should strongly center on the initial assessment of the AOR. The 
assessment would inform how a PRT should “conceive, plan, coordinate, and execute” 
determined initiatives. 76 
 
In conducting PRT operations, CALL identifies the critical importance of local integration 
with PRT actions. 77 In this respect, ensuring credit and activities are pursued by local 
stakeholders with the support of PRT personnel whenever possible should be 
considered a priority.    
 
Similarly, PRTs should be aware of the tenure under which they may be able to operate. 
This includes an awareness of an exit strategy, wherein responsibilities for the AOR 
may be transferred to succeeding development authorities or local centers of power. 78 
 
Risks & Threats 
 
CALL identifies one risk to the operation of PRT activity that is neither determined by 
the effectiveness of operations or operations themselves, but through the perception of 
activities by external actors. Due to the unique mission of the PRT to perform ‘capacity 
                                                 
76 The primary activities of the PRT are to conceive, plan, coordinate, and execute reconstruction and 
initial development projects and programs. Though PRTs are not development institutions per se, PRTs 
should adhere to the following principles to the extent possible. (p. 8 CALL) 
 
77 It is extremely important to link all PRT actions to governing bodies and local institutions as much as 
possible. Balance is the key; it may be preferable to have a local solution that is less optimal than a PRT 
solution. (p. 9 CALL) 
 
78 As host-nation governing bodies gain capacity and effectiveness, the PRT should cede responsibility 




development’, special consideration must be given to application of performance 
metrics to PRT operations. It is also for this reason, external actors should bear in mind 
the operations of PRTs may not be in the position to be uniquely judged by standard 
development metrics and output indicators. 79 
 
A risk which again speaks to the need to accurately perform an initial assessment of the 
local centers of power is the continued need to integrate all activities locally. Pursuing 
the role will also require the balancing of civilian and military staff to perform both 
military and non-military programs that may ensure the success of selected 
development initiatives. 80 The need for both military and non-military programs to 
ensure the success of PRT operations places an emphasis on the requisite that a 
balance and presence of both personnel types is necessary. Although the execution of 
professional programs requires the participation of civilian personnel, the presence of 
military personnel is not solely to ensure these activities may occur in a secure 
environment. The successful cooperation of civilian and military personnel should 
primarily focus on the successful completion of designated activities. 81  
                                                 
79 As with any diplomatic, defense, or development institution, there is a danger that PRTs may fall prey 
to pressure to deliver immediate but inappropriate proxy indicators of progress, including number of 
projects completed or quantity of funds expended. Perhaps what is not so clear is that some indicators 
that are considered effects within the development community are really only outputs for a PRT. For 
example, the development community may consider an increase in literacy or a decrease in child 
mortality to be an effect. (p. 9 CALL) 
 
80 The integration and alignment of civilian and military efforts are crucial to successful stability and 
reconstruction operations. PRTs must focus on supporting the host nation’s local governments and the 
populace across the stabilization and reconstruction sectors. This support requires balancing an 
emphasis on nonmilitary programs with the measured use of force. (p. 10 CALL) 
 
81 Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian 
organizations and expertise. However, effective implementation of these programs is more important than 
who performs the tasks. Civilian organizations bring expertise that complements that of military forces. At 
the same time, civilian capabilities cannot be employed effectively without the security that military forces 




Similarly respective to personnel action, the risks to PRT continuity of operations during 
the turnover of personnel remains high. The gaps to service and local knowledge during 
personnel turnover is a threat to the continued mission of the PRT. It should remain the 
responsibility of civilian agencies to monitor, assess, and deploy personnel to avoid 
large personnel turnovers. The same is true for PRT leadership, wherein executive and 
deputy positions should experience staggered personnel turnover. 82 
An additional risk experienced in the course of PRT operations is initially determining 
the sources of conflict in the AOR. In addition to identifying the local centers of power, 
identifying and mitigating the causes of conflict would contribute to the successive 
development of local economic, governmental, and socio-political capacity. As an 
example, CALL identifies that conflict may occur as a result of, but not be limited to, 
“including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, insurgency, criminal elements, 




Beyond the principles by which a PRT should operate and the awareness of risks that 
may threat the PRT mission, CALL identifies the requirement that operations must be 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
82 The various agencies involved in providing team members must ensure there are not gaps in functional 
coverage or a wholesale turnover of personnel over long deployments. Either of these will result in the 
PRT losing valuable understanding of the environment and could affect relationships with the local 
government and the people as a whole. Try to avoid rotating leadership positions (team leader and 
deputy team leader) at the same time. (p. 11 CALL) 
 
83 Determine the causes and means of conflict, including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, 
insurgency, criminal elements, and political instability; identify the triggers or opportunities to instigate 
conflict; determine ways to affect the causes and triggers; identify ways to mitigate or resolve the conflict; 





readily defined by their end objective. It is through a design of operations that supports 
the end objectives that may best meet the mission of the PRT.  
 
A key objective, against which operations will occur, must be the assertion that ‘capacity 
development’ will best occur through a deep integration with local leadership. An initial 
step in the objective would be increasing the legitimacy of local leadership, to better 
facilitate the efforts sought to be stood by the PRT, through local centers of power. 84 
 
In addition, the development of job creation protocols within the scope of increasing 
institutional capacity would further the opportunity to similarly tie informal, formal, and 
official local actors. Employment instruments would have the capacity to be positioned 
through formal officials, as mediated through community leaders, employing local labor. 
Ideally, the programs would have the ability to engage such PRT supported activities 
such infrastructure activities, commercial development, as well as road improvements. 
85 
 
A concluding element of the PRT concept is the ideal that personnel and PRT 
cooperation should cease in the rear of provincial activities. A critical element of 
ensuring the success of provincial activities is allowing for “host nation ownership” of 
development activities. The dual function of the reared position of PRT personnel are to  
bolster the legitimacy of local actors as well as stand the capability of local capability. 86 
                                                 
84 Build individual, organizational, and structural capacity to provide public safety and basic services such 
as sewage, water, electrical, trash‒health. Where relevant, tie legitimate, informal governance (traditional) 
leaders to nascent formal government organizations and tie appropriate reconstruction and stability 
projects to legitimate governing bodies. (p. 12 CALL) 
 
85 Develop job creation programs for infrastructure activities; provide micro lending as soon as 
practicable; tie road improvements to commercial as well as political integration; and create value-added 
facilities to improve agriculture and natural resource capabilities within the local absorptive capacity. (p. 
13 CALL) 
 




The aforementioned objectives are meant to be met through a series of local 
collaboration strategies identified by CALL.  
 
“Actively engage with the governor, host-nation central government officials, the local 
communities and population through provincial councils, provincial development 
committees, and other established and traditional bodies. 
 
Facilitate the visibility of the host-nation government’s presence in the province by 
assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation and 
communications). 
 
Promise only what you can deliver; manage expectations (under promise and over 
deliver). Never promise unless the money or assets are in hand. Even interest in a topic 
or project can be interpreted as a “promise. 
 
Plan sustainability at the outset.” 87 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, at times, it may be necessary to illustrate that the United States is doing something for the 
people (remember and respect that the operational pace will be that of the host nation). (p. 13 CALL) 
 
87 Actively engage with the governor, host-nation central government officials, the local communities and 
population through provincial councils, provincial development committees, and other established and 
traditional bodies. 
 
Facilitate the visibility of the host-nation government’s presence in the province by assisting official visits 
to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation and communications). 
 
Promise only what you can deliver; manage expectations (under promise and over deliver). Never 
promise unless the money or assets are in hand. Even interest in a topic or project can be interpreted as 
a “promise.” 
 






One area where operational guidance may persist beyond the formation of the PRT 
exists in the area of leadership. As of 2010, the National Command Authority in Iraq 
maintained the authority to designate the leadership authority of the individual PRT to 
either civilian or military personnel. Cause for the contingency was attributed to the 
unique climates that may be faced in the distinct provincial setting, whether conflict, 
conflict interim, or post conflict.  
 
“In a situation where active combat is expected or underway, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) may be the lead with other agencies in a supporting role. Where the 
environment is clearly post conflict and instability has diminished, the lead shifts to the 
Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of other 
civilian departments and agencies.” 88 
 
CALL, although, identifies that the individual PRT must have the ability to refine and 
execute operational guidance developed at higher levels of administration exterior to the 
AOR. The PRT, respective to its situation at the provincial level, has the unique ability to 
identify local objectives as they arise. To efficiently operate and assign resources, 
personnel, and directives, the PRT must have the capability to refine operational 
guidance, withstanding that it support existing strategic goals. 89  
 
                                                 
88 In a situation where active combat is expected or underway, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be 
the lead with other agencies in a supporting role. Where the environment is clearly post conflict and 
instability has diminished, the lead shifts to the Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for 
coordinating the efforts of other civilian departments and agencies. (p. 15 CALL) 
 
89 Therefore, PRTs play an important role in informing and refining operational guidance from 
intermediate or higher headquarters and ensuring the local objectives are effective, attainable, and 




Because the PRT is locally rooted, it provides the essential function of demonstrating 
ground conditions at the finest scale. The immediate nature ground conditions provide a 
level of situational awareness that may be overseen exterior to the AOR. As a result, 
the accurate assessment of the local environs assists in the development of local, 
regional, and national PRT efforts. Further, the level of ability to demonstrate progress 
on initiatives developed at the administrative level serves as a critical indicator in 
shaping successive coordination efforts. 90 
 
Yet, the PRT program should remain an initiative that truly functions as a joint civilian 
military effort, operations unique to the character of the particular province. CALL 
accedes that the PRT mission, given an assessment of the AOR, may require a primary 
focus on such divergent actions, under the umbrella of ‘capacity development’, as 
counterinsurgency, reconciliation, or economic development, thus requiring the 




Assistant to the concept of operations and objectives by which PRT activity will occur, 
CALL provides an assessment of the implementation of the PRT process, as indicative 
of requisite personnel, planning, and execution efforts. 
 
As identified in the concept of operations, a necessary initial step in the implementation 
of PRT activities is the sound analysis on contributing factors to instability within the 
                                                 
90 The PRT is an important “ground truth” check on interagency coordination at higher levels; if differing 
guidance cannot be integrated at the PRT level, it may well be indicative of disjointed coordination or 
planning at the regional or national level. (p. 16 CALL) 
 
91 The PRT program is a priority joint DOS/DOD initiative to bolster moderates, support U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic 
development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-
sufficiency. (p. 17 CALL) 
66 
 
AOR. Having, conditionally, identified the drivers, PRTs will become most effective in 
developing a multiyear plan shaped on suppressing the catalysts of instability and 
increasing capacity. 92 Successively, the placement of appropriate civilian and military 
personnel to address the drivers will be critical to the planning and execution of the 
successive multiyear planning phase. 
 
It is stressed that PRTs should be prepared to address drivers to instability that include, 
but are not limited to, tribal competition, insurgency, or weak local institutions. 93 In 
effect, it is a requirement of the PRT to determine and understand the drivers of 
instability, as to reduce conflict within the AOR. 94 The assessment will require the ability 
of personnel to identify the source and effect of variable threats on the social, political, 
and economic networks of the local population. 95 
 
A shortfall which should be avoided in the execution of planning efforts is the 
development of institutional memory, disregarding the imperative to persist in a cyclical 
revision of a multiyear plans as local conditions require. Further, a critical element of 
                                                 
92 However, a consensus is emerging that PRTs are most effective when they develop a multiyear plan of 
action based on their mission analysis and shaped by their analysis of what is driving instability and 
conflict in their area. (p. 19 CALL) 
 
93 The assessment should strive to determine the key impediments to achieving mission success. There 
may be instability based on tribal competition, conflict perpetrated by criminal or insurgent activities, or 
weak local institutions that prevent effective extension of the national government. (p. 19 CALL) 
 
94 The PRT’s job is to understand what is causing the instability and conflict in its area so that its 
interventions can reduce conflict and promote a more stable environment. (p. 20 CALL) 
 
95 The PRT needs to assess the potential drivers of instability and conflict in its AOR. These may include 
resource competition, sectarian animosity, ethnic violence, lack of meaningful economic opportunity, and 
culturally sanctioned vendettas. This assessment entails mapping the social, cultural, political, and 
economic networks the population lives with daily. The mapping is not a doctoral dissertation, but it 




stable continuity of operations is developing a contingency for unavoidable personnel 
turnover, as rotations occur. The contingency would address increasing the ownership 
of existing personnel activities on behalf of incoming personnel, as existing personnel 
rotations may conclude. Increasing the impact of successive ownership, existing 
personnel should perform a review of existing planning initiatives prior to the conclusion 
of rotations. 96 
 
A necessary tenet of the CM unit, in the revision of existing planning efforts, is the 
collaboration of all agencies active within the PRT, whether representative of local, 
regional, or national interests. 97 Although building capacity at the district and provincial 
level is the focus of the PRT, the CM unit remains an integral instrument of informal 
regional and national decision making. The demonstration of local knowledge assists in 
developing a level of situational awareness that otherwise may go unrepresented at 
administrative levels, save for local knowledge regarding traditional combat operations. 
98 
 
                                                 
96 The strategy can and should be reviewed and routinely revised, particularly before unit rotations or 
large personnel turnovers or as guidance or conditions change. (p. 20 CALL) 
 
97 The PRT is an interagency team and needs to plan as a team. Ideally, the PRT’s planning team should 
include functional, regional, and planning experts representing all the agencies active in the PRT. (p. 20 
CALL) 
 
98 Building governmental capacity above the provincial level is clearly beyond the scope of the PRT and is 
the responsibility of the national-level program; however, the PRT is best positioned to understand the 
specific needs within the province, district, or regional area within its responsibility and use the 
information to design local programs and inform national-level planning. While every situation is different, 
local governments often need help developing processes for citizen input, prioritizing government 
programs and projects, implementing budgeting processes, and establishing public security capabilities. 
Keep in mind that not all institutions are governmental; building the capacity of traditional governing 
mechanisms and civil society (religious groups, business institutions, and political parties) may also be 




The continued attention to changing objectives within the AOR must persist as long as 
PRT operations remain active. The ability to balance simultaneous objectives also acts 
as a determinant of success for PRT operations. The inquiry of resource allocation is 
not only the applies to the selection of objectives, but how to accomplish the given 
objective, whether population security, government infrastructure, or social welfare. 99 
 
In respect to performance monitoring, CALL assesses both the utility and difficulty of 
providing metrics that measure the output of development. The ability to self-identify 
performance within the PRT allows the unit to adapt, as the measure of existing 
activities may demonstrate impacts or inefficiencies. 100 Although, traditional indicators 
of output may have the ability to speak to quantitative measures of development, they 
are unable to address the qualitative impacts of the PRT mission. Because priority is 
placed on ‘capacity development’ within the PRT, focus is drawn on factors such as the 
degrees of local ownership, political stability, and true access to social services. 101 For 
these reasons, traditional performance measures may not exist, or be applicable, to the 
PRT effort. 
 
                                                 
99 The PRT constantly needs to balance conflicting goals. Is effective direct intervention in local disputes 
more important than efforts to increase the capacity of local security forces? Should limited reconstruction 
funds be used to build necessary government infrastructure or to increase the general population’s 
general welfare? (p. 30 CALL) 
 
100 The purposes of performance monitoring are to gather and present systematic, analytic information for 
the PRT’s own use in assessing the impact and effects of its efforts; to inform decision makers up the 
chain of command; and to report to Congress and the public. (p. 30 CALL) 
 
101 Output is usually easiest to measure (e.g., number of wells drilled, schools built, and police trained), 
but it does not measure the effects the PRT is trying to achieve. Outcomes or intermediate effects (e.g., 
how many have access to clean water, growth in school enrollment, and public perception of police) and 
longer-term impacts of activities on the overall situation (e.g., impact of wells on local power structure, 
perception of education’s impact on social values or economic prospects, impact of police training on 




CALL also identifies that PRTs are subject to a high rate of personnel turnover. 
Although civilians generally serve a year of duty, the intermittency of changes to details 
and assignments subject PRTs to improvisation. The distance and infrequent exposure 
experienced by personnel within the PRT whose resources are drawn in several 
directions, as well as the turnover of personnel, contribute to the loss of expertise that 
reduces the efficiency of PRT operations. 102 
 
As a consequence of frequent personnel turnover, the period of deployment for civilian 
personnel also contributes to the limitations of PRT activity. To address the limited time 
frame in which civilian personnel are able to engage effectively, CALL identifies a series 
of measures aimed at increasing personnel effectiveness in the AOR. One are which 
represents a significant threat to PRT operations has been maintaining continuity of 
operations through the persistent rotation of CM personnel. One method to address the 
threat to program continuity and personnel effectiveness can be to increase training in 
critical areas prior to deployment. These areas include, but are not limited to, increasing 
the depth of personnel briefing on previous activities, building in personnel overlap, and 
allowing for critical language and sensitivity training prior to deployment. 103 
                                                 
102 PRT staff is subject to a high rate of turnover. Civilians generally serve 12 months but often have gaps 
between assignments, while core military members serve 12 months and often have assignment 
overlaps. However, some military members may only serve six months. Unfortunately, changes in 
personnel often result in changes in PRT direction, objectives, and programs. Without a long-term plan, 
new arrivals are left to improvise their own programs, drawing on their own expertise, which results in 
choppy and ineffective PRT programming that wastes time and resources. (p. 32 CALL) 
 
103 A long-term common operational picture and strategic implementation plan assists with continuity. 
During their pre-deployment training, PRT members should strive to understand the specific area analysis 
and implementation plan provided by their predecessors. The new PRT should be aware of the causes of 
instability and conflict; strategies and implementation interventions, programs, activities, and measures of 
effectiveness as they relate to its work; the objectives of the maneuver brigade and other PRTs in the 
particular region; and the longer term U.S. government provincial goals and objectives. In addition to 
forwarding the planning documents, PRTs and military teams should complete the following tasks during 


























                                                                                                                                                             
Capture their experiences (both lessons learned and good practices) and present them to the incoming 
PRT, maneuver commanders and staffs, and implementing partners. 
Send materials from briefings to military and civilian PRT training units in the United States to update 
training materials. 
Attend and assist with the training of incoming teams and overlap with their successors, if possible. 
Highlight particularly valuable lessons learned on how to work in the environment, how to be a team 
player with civilian/military teams, how to engage the local community appropriately, and how to alter 
programming based on local input while making it complementary to the PRT’s and the maneuver 




Findings & Analysis 
 
Scope & Methodology 
 
The reason I have selected multiple sources of data, whether authored by SIGIR, CALL, 
or RAND, has been to have the ability to discuss PRT operations as they have occurred 
in planning, execution, and review through the initial years of the effort in Iraq. The role 
assumed by multiple sources of data has been the allowance to identify, extract, and 
amalgamate the parsed areas of interest, should they have been present in the review 
of PRT operations by unique stakeholders. 
 
As a reaction, the application of a selected methodology, such as meta-analysis, has 
allowed for the ability to select and extract qualitative datum from unique sources, in 
support of an arching framework of inquiry, related but exterior to the source. The 
grouped identification of selected datum, from the selected sources of data, has been to 
demonstrate a strong pattern, respective to the related interests of the area of research. 
It is my expectation that the process has, to a marginal extent, mitigated the 
weaknesses associated with static data, correspondent to a single period of inquiry, 
duration, and place. 
 
I project the ability, and freedom, to interpret variably sourced data would allow for an 
alternative method to engage in a discourse of areas of opportunity, strengths, and 
threats to PRT operations. The goal has not been to identify finite measures of 
improvement or concrete actions to improve the efficiency of either extant or future PRT 
operations. The goal has been to develop areas of focus where leadership may target 
and allocate the necessary measures of inquiry, personnel, and resources. The result, 
herein enumerated, is the potential measure of inquiry on which CM leadership could 
draw focus in future CM engagements.  
 
The amendments to organizational behavior could potentially represent, as it is the 
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expectation of the current body of research, organizational changes to decision making 

































In addressing the ability of the Provincial Reconstruction Team to meet the needs of 
‘capacity development’ through the use of civilian and military personnel, data 
respective to past operational capability has been selected to demonstrate the breadth 
of PRT activity. Simultaneously, the unique selection of references to operational 
capabilities has been grouped to illustrate the character of civilian military capabilities, 
likewise respective to ‘capacity development’. 
 
A critical return of characterizing civilian military capabilities has been the dialogue 
which operates with and against the data, in the form of further inquiries of existing 
assessments and operations.   
 
The following are areas of focus on which I have particular attention, seeking to develop 
additional attention on a given aspect of PRT operational capability. Withstanding the 
analysis of multiple sources of data, subject to the context of increasing PRT 
operational capabilities, the following inquiries are representative of areas that should 





x Does the ability to build local capacity occur provided only a linear reduction in 
conflict, drivers of instability? 
x What development metrics may be applied to PRT activities, if at all, withstanding 









 Access to agency sourced funding? 
 Access to transport? 
 Access to material goods? 
 Access to local centers of power? 
 
x Can standing a PRT prior to administrative and operational capability justified? 
x What are the determinants in the defining the ‘effective’ boundaries of the AOR? 
 
x What is the established threshold, if at all, of personnel count for an established 
PRT? 
 
 Can a PRT operate in the absence of civilian personnel? 
 Does the PRT operational capability maintained in the absence of 
DoS, USAID personnel? 
 Is the converse true; is there a threshold at which a PRT become 
too large to maintain effectiveness, respective to operational 
capability? 
 
x How does intelligence, sourced external to the PRT, assist PRT operational 
capability? 
 
 What is the level of intelligence required by PRT? 
 Does the PRT, and staff through varying depths of operations, have 
access to sufficient levels of intelligence?  
  
x What instruments are in place to determine drivers of instability? 
x Does the availability of personnel, resources determine drivers of instability 
addressed in PRT operations? 
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x Is it possible to focus on multiple objectives, simultaneously, within a single 
AOR? 
x Given the identification of a key objective, such as the suppression of insurgency 




x What are the instruments that will be used to address difficulties, in future CM 
engagements, in initially identifying DoS staff to fill civilian positions? 
x What are the long term effects of initially staffing, open, civilian positions with 
military personnel? 
x Would the further specification of skill set requirements for a civil affairs officer, 
for the purposes of staffing an open civilian position, mitigate the loss associated 
with the open position; would the same action represent a marginal gain against 
an expedient staffing of CA personnel? 
x How do you mitigate the loss of local knowledge direction that may occur with 
periodic rotations to civilian and military staff? 
x What are the knowledge retention instruments in place to minimize, unintended, 
interpretive freedom to existing multi-year plans? 
x What is the role of private contractors in the delivery of PRT initiatives? 
x What are the unique obstacles of their involvement in accomplishing the intended 




x How much flexibility should be built into initial MOAs regarding CM engagements, 






x How do resources available to combat operations at the respective base of 




x If the development of local capacity requires a catalyst to increase political will 
amongst local stakeholders, how does the CM unit assign levels of prioritization 
to informal, formal, and local officials? 
 
x What are the direct incentives for the participation of local stakeholders? 
 
 Do the incentives vary for informal leaders, formal leaders, or local 
government officials? 
 Does the timeline at which stakeholders are engaged, if at all, vary; 
similarly, does the schedule at which they receive incentives vary? 
 
x What are the instruments of accountability in the delegation of employment 
programs to local centers of power, whether informal, formal, or local officials? 
x What are the associated risks of indirectly tasking the execution of initiatives 
planned at the administrative level of the PRT? 
x Does the cumulative benefit of political integration outweigh the risks of 




x To what extent did National Security Presidential Directives 36 ¦ 44 and Defense 
Directive 3000.05 ultimately determine and provide insight to terminal 







At an initial point of my research where interest lied in determining how PRTs were able 
to implement development and infrastructure activities in conflict interim and post 
conflict environments. As a result, the research question was positioned to identify how 
do PRTs, as CM civilian military units, accomplish this mission in terms of personnel 
selection, mix, and situation? The initial step was looking at the CM units and 
determining the approach to light infrastructure and economic development, amongst a 
cadre of additional development activities with the given civilian military integration. 
 
Although, in identifying literature that spoke to PRT activities, the nature of research 
sensibly moved beyond estimating performance metrics for the CM unit’s ability to 
perform reconstruction and development. A key reason for the transition was the visible 
focus of PRT activities, rather, on ‘capacity development’. 
 
This has been a strong area of focus in the review of PRT operational capability, 
beyond performance metrics that are meant to measure the aggregate output of PRT 
initiatives. The difficulty of measuring output must also be made against operational 
activities that may be exterior to the PRT itself. Rather, the identification of whether a 
PRT is equipped with the necessary resources, positioned to meet the mission, and 
ability to maintain an operational capacity would be the appropriate measure of 
evaluation. 
 
This has been the focus of my research, selection of data, and subject of my analysis. 
What are the threats and opportunities to the operational capacity of the PRT, 
respective to meeting the core mission requirement of capacity development? In the 
previous section, I have offered a number of inquiries to be measured against the 
unique areas of PRT operational capability. In the following subheadings, I offer 










Personnel & Regional Assessments 
Subject Matter Expertise 


























Personnel preparedness should also be an area of concern in addressing the 
operational capability of the PRT. Instruments that may be able to address workforce 
preparedness may be myriad, but several are a key concern in maintaining the 
operational capability of PRT personnel. 
 
One area of focus should deliberate on the structure of personnel rotations. In this 
respect, a period of induction and discharge should be accounted for in identifying the 
period of peak effectiveness. Because this may reduce the period of peak effectiveness 
from 12 mos. to 8 mos., duties, expectations, and partner initiatives must account for 
the characteristics of individual personnel rotations. 
 
In addition, personnel turnover should be an area of concern, to receive focus in past 
and future CM engagements. The underlying concern to personnel turnover is mitigating 
the loss of local knowledge and expertise upon the departure of PRT personnel. 
Assuring a return on investment in developing best practices for CM ¦ PRT 
engagements should not only be limited to the development of doctrine, posterior to 
operations. Increasing organization wide access to instruments which may increase 
operational capability would lie in the capture of personnel expertise and lessons 
learned, beyond their departure. This not only speaks to the development of literature, 
graphic materials, and the informal transmission of knowledge between personnel, but 
also to the scheduling of rotations. It is imperative, if possible, that an allowance be 
issued for the overlap of personnel tasked to complementary duties, if not positions.  
In an operational capacity, civilian personnel must also possess the flexibilities that 
preclude humanitarian organizations from operating in the AOR and make military 
personnel suited to undertake activities therein. The flexibilities possessed by personnel 
must extend to maintaining an active interest in ground level activities as well as the 
willingness to engage local stakeholders in an open dialogue in which credibility is 
established. This credibility may extend to the development of trust, the appropriate 
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nature of the intended course of action, as well as the demonstration of long term 
benefits that local ownership would allow. 
 
Respective to both civilian and military personnel, access to critical language skills, 
whether through additional training or through ready access to an interpreter is a crucial 
element to ensuring the operational capability of a PRT. Due to the emphasis on local 
operations and “ground truth” within the PRT mission, the ability to communicate with 
informal, formal, and local officials within the AOR does not have a substitute. The 
ability to communicate directly with local Iraqi actors would increase the credibility of 
PRT personnel as well as the legitimacy, and likelihood of local ownership, of 
operations. All levels of personnel, for which it is a requisite to interact with local Iraqi 
actors, should receive ready access to critical language skills. In the case of additional 
training, both permanent civilian staff and contractors should receive language training 
prior to deployment. If additional training is not possible, the PRT should be staffed with 
interpreters whose sole responsibility is facilitating PRT operations. The PRT cannot be 
expected to properly function with resources, such as interpreters, shared with 


















In addition to the respective constraints of deploying existing personnel, the prior 
recruitment of federal personnel must be considered a contributing factor to increasing 
the operational capabilities of the civilian component in respective CM operations. 
Changes to the recruitment practices of personnel anticipated to engage in CM 
operations will address a number of the constraints experienced by the DoS including, 
but not limited to: 
 
x Addressing the difficulty of recruiting personnel for postings in current zones of 
conflict; 
x Deploying experienced personnel to address cadre of unique ‘capacity 
development’ issues; 
x Determining personnel base to best integrate into CM environment; 
 
Targeting the three areas of threat to the successful deployment and tasking of civilian 
personnel to CM operations may rely on the restructuring of multiple recruitment 
practices at DoS regarding personnel meant to operate in CM engagements. One 
method to address the constraints of an existing workforce tasked to wholly address 
future CM engagements would be the further development of a contingent workforce 
within DoS meant to specialize in CM engagements. The development, although, of a 
contingent force within DoS meant to prepare, deploy, and integrate into CM 
engagements would rely upon the prior changes to the planning, recruitment, and 
organization of incoming personnel. 
 
The development of a contingent force within DoS would rely on targeting several areas 
of weakness, including, but not limited to: 
 





x Skills ¦ Expertise 
 
 
Contingent Force Planning 
 
x Develop contingency units for strategic regions; 
x Model existing efforts to strategic regions; 
x Increase recruitment of regional ¦ development professionals; 




x Identify pre-existing gaps in necessary personnel;  
x Develop future needs applicant pool; 
x Increase personnel willingness to travel; 
x Target veteran military officers; 
 
x Increase incentives associated with recruitment of temporary federal employee 
targeted at critical posts; 
 Under temporary contracts; increase added value; 
 Facilitate transition to permanent status; 
 Allow for critical language skill training; 
 
x Respective to future recruitment of permanent personnel; increase factors 
leading to high needs service; 






x Identify existing human capital assets for deployment; CM engagements; 
x Address existing workforce balance; 
 Propensity for middle and senior level personnel to deploy to critical 
posts in CM engagements; 
 
Skills ¦ Expertise 
 
Additionally, the development of a contingent force, meant to address the unique 
qualifications of civilian personnel tasked to CM engagements, will require the 
assistance of sample competency requirements as an instrument for use in personnel 
selection. A competency model, meant to address the requisite flexibilities of conflict 
interim development, should be prepared as a measure of recruitment into a contingent 
force within DoS.  
 
x Develop workforce competency model; 
 Identify applicable education ¦ career experiences; 
 Demonstrates required flexibilities, adaptability,  
 Distinguish hierarchy of personnel qualifications;  
 Identify critical areas of expertise; 
o Civilian Military relations; 
o Local governance; 
o Regional knowledge; 
o Language skills; 
o Economic development; 
o Agriculture; 
o Physical planning; 
x Maintain flexibility in the workforce to operate; transfer skills to necessary 
regions; 
x To counterbalance the influence of career military personnel tasked to security 
and logistics, civilian personnel must be able to integrate seamlessly into a 
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Personnel & Regional Assessments 
 
To address threats to personnel qualifications, the coordination of PRT civilian 
personnel must be based upon an effective character assessment of the region in which 
operations will occur. Prior knowledge of the particular province, respective forward 
operating base, and sites to which civilian personnel will be deployed would be 
invaluable in becoming familiar with the AORs demography, urban areas, topography, 
natural resources, infrastructure, road networks, etc. Additionally, personnel awareness, 
upon their arrival and throughout their stay, regarding the condition, security, and 
threats to the tasked AOR would be greatly increased. As a result, the prior knowledge 
of the AOR will increase the likelihood of success in the key planning, organization, and 





















Subject Matter Expertise 
 
The inclusion of subject matter expertise is also a critical component to the success of 
PRTs. Further, given the particular character of the AOR, the personnel mix of civilian 
professionals, whether from USACE, DoS, DoA, DoJ, and USAID will vary from PRT to 
PRT. Particular attention must be given by leadership to the effectiveness the 
placement, of a subject matter expert, will bear in an AOR. Additionally, attention must 
be given to whether resources, personnel, and logistical support are in place to 
capitalize on the SME. Failure to do so may see the effective or ineffective placement of 























CM Occupational Skills Balance 
 
If the opportunity is available, the selection of civilian personnel assigned to a 
contingent force, CM units, or PRTs should reflect a complementary to the makeup of 
DoD personnel with which civilian personnel will be paired. This is inclusive of, but not 
limited to, accounting for military occupational specialties and any relevant experience 
of paired military personnel within the contingent force. This is also to include specific 



























A critical area of interest should be maintaining a balance between civilian and military 
personnel. This balance, although, does not speak to a specific percentage of civilian 
and military personnel, rather a requisite to maintain an expected order within 
operations and maintenance, that would be lost with the unexpected influx of civilian or 
military personnel. The ad hoc injection of personnel not only increases the requisite 
time burden of increased coordination, but also the level of resources that may not be 
met with facility, given current operational capabilities. In this respect, given the 
particular character of the AOR in which a PRT operates, it may be suitable that the CM 
unit maintain a 35/65 mix and it is this character which should not be disrupted, in either 
balance or quantity, given the associated risks of destabilizing existing operations. One 






















PRT initiatives should be planned in anticipation of risks associated with implementing 
partners, outside of the PRT chain of command. The delegation of tasks within the 
advanced phases of a PRT borne initiative to an implementing partner, especially in 
respect to physical planning activities, should have the opportunities and threats to the 
action weighed prior to the devolution of responsibility. 
 
Withstanding the discharge of executable activities, where resources and personnel do 
not allow for the direct implementation of PRT initiatives, there should exist an 
environment of increased monitoring and evaluation of implementing partners and 
contractors. Although PRT personnel may not persist in being directly responsible for 
the execution of planned initiatives, especially as related to physical planning activities, 
assisting in a supervisory role to initiative partners further ensures the legitimacy of 
existing local partnerships and the opportunity for a greater level of future participation 

















Drivers of Instability 
 
Respective to obstacles which threat the operational capabilities of the PRT, an initial 
action is the assessment of local centers of power, as well as the identification of drivers 
of instability within the AOR. The latter is representative of an area on which there must 
be shared consensus amongst civilian and military personnel. The agreement on extant 
drivers of instability within the AOR not only prevents the fracturing of resources and 
personnel, but maintains an alignment on mission critical tasks. To accomplish an 
agreement on drivers of instability, civilian and military must either be prepared to adopt 
a similar framework for the assessment of instability or maintain a preparedness to 
develop consensus between competitive assessments of instability.   
 
In addition, the PRT must also internalize the possibility that a CM presence is also 
representative of a driver of instability. The presence of personnel, resources, and an 
active security element, given the particular character of the AOR, may otherwise 
increase drivers for instability beyond their natural course. An additional risk, with the 
influx of resources appropriated for community development, is the disaggregation and 
fracturing of centers of power, in order to compete for existing resources. Therefore, the 
difficulty, or inability to self-identify as a driver of instability, whether or not it is the case, 
denies the PRT critical element in being able to decision making regarding the 














An additional area of focus to counter an existing obstacle confronting the operational 
capacity of PRT is the accurate targeting of CM initiatives.  
 
One method to improve the accuracy of targeting may be through the increased pursuit 
of Iraqi initiated projects. This method requires the coordination of personnel, not only 
within the PRT, within the FOB to communicate local knowledge acquired at ground 
level. Withstanding the ability to communicate, through a translator or through personal 
ability, key pieces of information such as, but not limited to, disruption to civilian life, 
community infrastructure, and local industries would assist in targeting successful PRT 
initiatives. 
 
In one instance, the accurate targeting of CM initiatives will work towards catalyzing 
economic development in the target area. PRT led initiatives have the capability to 
revitalize depressed industries that have been destabilized by conflict and community 
fragmentation. The resulting intervention may see increases in local employment, an 

















Inherently, the successful coordination of CM operations has, does, and will require the 
unobstructed cooperation between civilian and military personnel. A critical effect of 
cooperation is not only the allowance for increased coordination between personnel; it is 
the insight that allows the discreet personnel within a PRT, tasked to a particular duty, 
that allows personnel to grant focus to their work, assured and informed of a similar 



























In addition to the influx of personnel, the operational capability of a PRT depends on the 
ability to ensure that resources do not exceed the capacity of personnel within the PRT. 
An abundance of resources can potentially represent a threat to the coordination, 
cooperation, and abilities of a PRT. This is not to say that resources should, and can 
only, either be negated or misallocated. An existing contingency, whether it be a graded 
variant of existing operations, may assist in the management of additional resources. As 
opposed to the resources themselves, in absence of the contingency, the preparedness 
provided for through a contingency also decreases the risks and burdens associated 
























The effectiveness of activities pursued by the PRT must also adhere to the simplified 
concept of sustainability. Beyond the discussion of industrial efficiencies, carbon 
neutrality, and resource management, the selected initiatives of the PRT must 
appreciate the local context. Projects must have the ability to persist and sustain 
themselves beyond the departure of the PRT. This not only speaks to physical practices 
such as the development of infrastructure which maintains a purpose within the AOR, 
but to the installment of political instruments which will remain viable beyond the 
terminal date of coalition support. This would be accomplished through the local 
ownership and operation of, previously, PRT supported activities. The practice of 
developing sustainable initiatives must speak to a fundamental understanding of local 
history, culture, and community networks. Similarly, the effects of mirror imaging must 
be avoided in the identification of projects, to avoid solutions, although preferable in situ 
elsewhere, are a misallocation of resources, personnel, and time in the given AOR. The 
pursuit of such projects also risk desertion, cultural insensitivity, or the inefficient 


















In the previous thesis, I have identified a number of areas upon which future civilian and 
military personnel will be able to draw focus regarding the operational capacity of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I, although, understand that the preceding body of 
inquiry has focused on efforts that have undergone a series of transformations since the 
production of reports upon which I have focused, the period in which I have conducted 
research, and the publication of the text at hand. 
 
It is my hope that the current text has been able to draw further attention to the critical 
period, found in the early stages of development in civilian ¦ military engagements. In 
addition, it is my expectation that I have noted, in some part, the diverse role which non-
combat operations may assume in military engagements. In the current role, 
strengthening local government, increasing access to infrastructure, as well as 
economic development.  
 
The need for additional research on the civilian military unit continues. The application 
of similar lines of effort, as applied through the PRT, can only be expected to reappear 
as method to strengthen the platform of future military engagements. For this reason, I 
expect the lessons of international development, the cadre of respective professionals, 
and civilian federal personnel to further play a pivotal role within future theaters of 
conflict. In doing so, civilian ¦ military efforts will assume, not a subordinate but, a 
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01 Illustrative Note 
 
The following cartographic documents are included for illustrative purposes only. They are not meant to 
serve as operational or planning documents. The following cartographic documents are only meant to 
broadly contextualize geographic, geopolitical, and features of interest. The documents have been 
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